

- Q. This year?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. I am not talking about that. Did you see Mr. Darley that time when Mr. Holloway was sick?  
A. When Mr. Holloway was sick, I disremember now whether I seen Mr. Darley that day or not.
- Q. Did you see Mr. Schiff that day?  
A. I disremember whether I saw Mr. Schiff or not.
- Q. You disremember that?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Did you see anybody that day?  
A. Yes, sir, I seen somebody that day.
- Q. Who?  
A. I saw Mr. Frank that day for one person.
- Q. I know; but outside of Mr. Frank, who else of the office force did you see that day—anybody or not?  
A. The office force; well, I disremember now.
- Q. You disremember now?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Well, now, the next time you watched there, that was Thanksgiving, wasn't it?  
A. No, sir, that was before Thanksgiving.
- Q. Before Thanksgiving?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. About what time?  
A. Well, it was somewhere about the last of August.
- Q. Last of August?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Well, now did you see anybody there that day? Was Mr. Holloway sick that day, too? He was sick that day, too, wasn't he?  
A. No, sir, he wasn't sick that day.
- Q. Did you see him?  
A. Yes, sir, I saw him that day.
- Q. What time did he leave that day?  
A. I don't know; he left about two o'clock, I reckon.
- Q. Don't reckon, please, Jim; tell us if you have any memory about it, say so; and if you haven't, say you haven't, please.  
A. He left away from there about two o'clock.
- Q. Then, awhile ago you said about half past two, and now you state two?  
A. No, sir, I said he left away from there about half past two the first time.
- Q. And this time, what time did you say he left?  
A. I said he left away from there about two.
- Q. About two o'clock?  
A. Yes, sir, that time.
- Q. Did you see Mr. Darley that day?  
A. I disremember whether I did or not.
- Q. You disremember that?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. The next time was Thanksgiving day—that you watched for him?  
A. The next time I watched for him—
- Q. Was Thanksgiving Day?  
A. Was the last day, the last of September, behind Thanksgiving Day.

- Q. That was behind Thanksgiving Day?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Before or after Thanksgiving, Jim?  
A. This here was before Thanksgiving.  
Q. Haven't you said half a dozen times that you watched in September, and that was after Thanksgiving? Haven't you told that a dozen times to the jury?  
A. I said it was after Thanksgiving.  
Q. Yes?  
A. Well, September is after Thanksgiving.  
Q. Your understanding is that it was after Thanksgiving?  
A. Yes, sir, it was after Thanksgiving.  
Q. So that it was in September, after Thanksgiving?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. That is correct, now, Jim?  
A. Yes, sir, after Thanksgiving.  
Q. Yes, that is right. Well now, that day, Mr. Darley was there that day?  
A. Yes, sir, I remember seeing him there that day.  
Q. Was Mr. Schiff there?  
A. Yes, sir, Mr. Schiff was there that day.  
Q. What time did Mr. Darley leave  
A. I don't know what time he left.  
Q. What time did Mr. Schiff leave?  
A. I don't know what time he left.  
Q. What time did Mr. Holloway leave?  
A. Mr. Holloway left away from there about half past two.  
Q. Do you remember that?  
A. Yes, sir, I can remember that.  
Q. How can you remember when Mr. Holloway left and yet don't remember when anybody else left?  
A. I can always remember when he leaves, because you always have to tell him when you have to leave out and how long you are going to stay.  
Q. You tell him when you are going to leave, and how long you are going to stay?  
A. I didn't tell him that time, because I was going to work that evening.  
Q. The next time, did you tell him you were going to ring out?  
A. No, sir, I didn't tell him that I was going to ring out.  
Q. The next time, did you tell him?  
A. No, sir, I just told him I was going to work.  
Q. If you never told him that you were going to ring out, how do you remember when he left?  
A. Because I will tell you, if I didn't have any other work to do I would go down to the first floor and sit on a box and go to smoking, and he worked down there.  
Q. And you didn't tell him when you were going to ring out?  
A. No, sir. I didn't tell him when I was going to ring out.  
Q. Therefore, your ringing out had nothing to do with when he left, because you never told him?  
A. No, sir, I never told him that.  
Q. You never told him anything about it? Well, now, in September, after Thanksgiving, was Mr. Darley there that day?  
A. Yes, sir, I remember seeing Mr. Darley that day.  
Q. Was Mr. Schiff there that day?  
A. Yes, sir, I remember seeing him there.

- Q. What time did Mr. Holloway leave?  
A. Mr. Holloway left away from there about two o'clock.  
Q. The next time you watched was right after Christmas?  
A. No, sir, the next time I watched was Thanksgiving Day, then—  
Q. You said awhile ago September was after Thanksgiving?  
A. Yes, sir, after Thanksgiving day.  
Q. All right. Well, now, Thanksgiving Day, the day you have told about in January, who did you see there in January, I mean who of the force?  
A. I disremember now who I did see in January when I was there that morning.  
Q. You disremember?  
A. Yes, sir, I disremember.  
Q. Can you remember anybody you saw there?  
A. Nobody I saw there at all. Mr. Holloway, I can remember.  
Q. Jim, isn't it true that on every Saturday morning, a number of people come there to that factory always?  
A. Well, I don't know, I couldn't tell; nobody but just them that worked there.  
Q. The first you watched, tell us anybody that come there that day?  
A. I couldn't remember that; I couldn't tell you.  
Q. You don't know about that?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. The second time, you don't know whether anybody was working there or not?  
A. To my memory, I think there were some young ladies working up on the fourth floor.  
Q. Some ladies working there that evening up on the four floor?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. That is your memory about the second time?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Then, the third time, was anybody working there that evening, Saturday evening?  
A. I don't know about the third time.  
Q. You don't remember whether there were some young ladies working up there that evening?  
A. No, sir, I don't know about the third time.  
Q. You can't remember about that?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. Well now, Thanksgiving, do you know whether anybody was working there Thanksgiving evening?  
A. No, sir, I don't know whether anybody was working there Thanksgiving evening or not.  
Q. You don't know whether Mr. Schiff worked there that evening?  
A. No, sir, I don't know whether Mr. Schiff worked that evening or not.  
Q. You can't remember that, can you?  
A. I didn't see Mr. Schiff at all.  
Q. You can't remember whether he was there or not?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. You wouldn't swear that he was not there?  
A. I will swear I didn't see him; I will swear he wasn't in the office with Mr. Frank.  
Q. You swear to that?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Will you swear he wasn't there that day?  
A. I will swear Mr. Irby was working in the office.

- Q. Thanksgiving Day?  
A. No, sir, he wasn't working in the office on Thanksgiving.  
Q. The next time, was there any ladies working on the fourth floor?  
A. I don't remember.  
Q. You don't remember whether there were or not?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. You can't remember that?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. They might have been?  
A. I didn't see none of them there.  
Q. You didn't see them?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. You only saw them working there one day?  
A. I saw them working there the second evening.  
Q. On the fourth floor.  
Q. Did you say anything about it? Do you think that you told about watching for Frank at that time. You think you told that at that time?  
A. I don't know where I told them at that very time.  
Q. Didn't you say that you did?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. That's your opinion that you did?  
A. I aint got no opinion about it.  
Q. Well, that's your best recollection that you did?  
A. No, sir, it's not my best recollection.  
Q. Well, what is your best recollection, that you didn't then?  
A. What do you mean by that.  
Q. Did you or did you not?  
A. I don't know, sir. I'm telling you the truth.  
Q. Well, he had already had that signal about stamping and whistling a long time. What did he give it to you over again for?  
A. He told me that Thanksgiving, but didn't do it until I set then on the box.  
Q. Didn't you say he always gave you that signal?  
A. No, sir. I didn't say he always gave me that signal.  
Q. Gave it to you Thanksgiving?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. And repeated it to you that day again?  
A. Yes, sir.

The witness Conley was examined by the solicitor, who brought out the direct questions and answers Supra, and was then cross-examined by the defendant, when counsel brought out the cross-questions and answers Supra.

Thereafter, and while the witness Conley was still on the stand, Defendant's Counsel moved to rule out, exclude, and withdraw from the jury each and all of said questions and answers, upon the grounds stated at the time said motion was made that said questions and answers were irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial, and dealt with other matters and things irrelevant and disconnected with the issues in the case.

The Court denied this motion in writing, making in so doing the following order:



"When the witness Conley was still on the stand his testimony not having been finished, the defendant, by his attorneys, moved to rule out, withdraw and exclude from the jury each and all the above questions and answers, because the same are irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial, and deals with other matters and things irrelevant and disconnected with the issues of this case. After hearing argument of counsel, the Court overruled the motion to rule out, withdraw or exclude said above stated questions and answers from the jury, but permitted the same to remain before the jury."

In making said order and declining to rule out, exclude and withdraw said questions, and each of them, as well as all of the answers and each of them, the Court erred, for the reason that said questions and answers, each and all of them, were irrelevant, immaterial, illegal, prejudicial, and dealt with other matters and things wholly disconnected with the issues on trial, and the same amounted to accusing the defendant of other and independent crimes.

Defendant contends that this ruling of the Court was highly prejudicial to the defendant, tending to disgrace him before the jury and expose him to a conviction, not because he had committed murder, but because he was accused of depravity and degeneracy.

When the third of the direct questions here sought to be excluded was asked by the solicitor the defendant objected because the evidence sought would be immaterial. The Court sustained the objection but the solicitor continued with the balance of the direct questions and answers here objected to and the cross-questions were thereafter asked and the answers given. The Court therefore erred in not excluding and withdrawing all of said testimony.

14. Because the Court erred in not ruling out, excluding, and withdrawing the following evidence direct and cross of the witness Conley, upon motion of defendant's counsel, made while Conley was still on the stand.

"I always stayed on the first floor like I stayed April 26th and watched for Mr. Frank while he and a young lady would be up on the second floor chatting. I don't know what they were doing; he only told me they wanted to chat. When the young ladies would come there, I would sit down at the first floor and watch the door for him. I watched for him several times. There will be one lady for Mr. Frank and one lady for another young man who was there. Mr. Frank was there along on Thanksgiving Day. I watched for him several times. A tall, heavy built lady come there that day. He told me when the lady came he would stamp and let me know that was the lady, and for me to go and lock the door. Well, the lady came, and he stamped, and I locked the door. He told me when he got through with the lady he would whistle for me to go and unlock the door. . . . And he says: (on April 26th) 'Now, when the lady comes, I will stamp like I did before' . . . I have seen Mr. Frank there in the office two or three times before Thanksgiving, and a lady was in the office, and she was sitting down in a chair and she had her clothes up to here, and he was down on his knees, and she had her hands on him. I have also seen Mr. Frank another time with a young lady lying on the table. She was on the edge of the table. I don't know the name of the woman that was there Thanksgiving Day; the man that was there was Mr. Dalton. . . . The lady that was there was a tall built lady, heavy

weight, she was nice looking, had on a blue looking dress with white dots in it, had on a greyish looking coat with kind of tails on it, white slippers and white stockings.

#### CROSS EXAMINATION.

"The first time I watched for Mr. Frank was sometime during last summer, about in July. I would be there sweeping and Mr. Frank come out and called me in the office. That was on a Saturday, about three o'clock. As to what Mr. Dalton would do, the young lady that worked at the factory would go out and get him and bring him back there. That was Mr. Dalton's lady. The lady that was with Mr. Frank was Miss Daisy Hopkins. She worked up there on the fourth floor. When Mr. Frank called me, there was a lady in the office with him. He talked to me in the lady's presence. She was Miss Daisy Hopkins. That was three or half past three. He would say: 'Did you see that lady go out there? You go down and see nobody don't come up here and you will have a chance to make some money.' One lady had already gone on out to get that young man, and the other lady was present. She came back after a while and brought Mr. Dalton with her. They walked into Mr. Frank's office and stayed there ten or fifteen minutes, came back down, and she says: 'All right, James,' and I says: 'All right;' and I would go back there to the trap door that leads down to the basement, and I pulled up the trap door, and they went down there. I opened the door because she said she was ready; I knowed where she was going. Mr. Frank told me to watch; he told me where they were going. I don't know how long they stayed there; I don't know what time they came back, but they came back after a while, the same way they came down. I kept the doors shut—not locked—all the time, and never left it. Mr. Dalton gave me a quarter and went out laughing, and the lady went up the steps. She didn't stay very long and came down, and after that Mr. Frank came down and left. That was about half past four. I left before Mr. Frank did. He gave me a quarter. That was the first Saturday. The next Saturday was about two weeks after that, about the last of July or the first of August. He told me the same Saturday that I was there: 'Now, you know what you done for me last Saturday. I want to put you wise this Saturday.' I says: 'All right, what time?' He says: 'Oh, about half past.' He got back from lunch about a quarter past two, then Mr. Holloway left, and then Miss Daisy Hopkins came into his office. Mr. Frank came out, popped his fingers and bowed to me—bowed his head to me, and then went back in the office. Then, I went down and stood by the door. I didn't lock it; I shut it. I don't know what happened next; I didn't hear him come out of his office at all. Then I went down and watched. No, I didn't hear her come out of his office. Mr. Frank stayed there about a half an hour that day, then the girl went out. He gave me a half a dollar, this time. The next time I watched for him was before Thanksgiving Day, sometime in the winter, about the last part of August. When he told me he wanted me to watch for him that time, it was on the fourth floor, right at the elevator. Snowball was standing there then. Mr. Frank says: 'I want to put you wise again for to-day.' He came back about half past two, and he says: 'She will be here in a minute.' The lady that came in was one that worked on the fourth floor. I don't know her name. It wasn't Miss Daisy Hopkins. She had hair like Mr. Hooper's, grey haired. She had a green suit of clothes. She went to Mr. Frank's office, and then I watched. I didn't hear them leave Mr. Frank's office. Then she came out, and then he came out and went out the factory, and then he came back. I stayed there waiting for him. He said: 'I didn't take out that money.' I says: 'I seed you didn't.' He said: 'That's



all right, old boy, I don't want you to have anything to say to Mr. Herbert or Mr. Darley about what's going on around here.' The next time I watched was Thanksgiving day. I met Mr. Frank there about eight o'clock in the morning. He says: 'A lady will be here in a little while; me and her are going to chat. I don't want you to do no work; I just want you to watch.' The lady came in about a half an hour. I didn't know her; I have never seen her working at the factory. I had seen her at the factory two or three nights before Thanksgiving Day in Mr. Frank's office about eight o'clock. She was a nice looking lady. I think she had on black clothes. She was a very tall, heavy built lady. The front door was open when she came Thanksgiving Day. She went up stairs and went in Mr. Frank's office. Mr. Frank came out and stamped right above the trash barrel. I was down stairs about the trash barrel. He told me he was going to stamp two times; then he stamped, and I closed the door, and then I came back and sat on the box about an hour and a half. Mr. Frank says: 'I'll stamp after this lady comes, and you go and shut the door and turn that night latch.' That's the first time he told me to lock the door, and he says: 'If everything is all right, you take and kick against the door.' And I kicked against the door. I stayed there about an hour and a half that time. Then, Mr. Frank came down and unlocked the front door, looked up the street, and then went back and told the lady to come down. She came down and said to Mr. Frank, while they were walking: 'Is that the nigger?' and he says: 'Yes.' And she says: 'Well, does he talk much?' and he says: 'He's the best nigger I've ever seen.' They went on out together; Mr. Frank came back. I went in his office. He gave me a \$1.25. The lady had on a blue skirt with white dots in it, and white slippers and white stockings, and a grey tailor-made coat with pieces of black velvet on the edges of it, and a black hat with big black feathers over. The next time I watched for him was a Saturday in January, right after the first of the year. He said there will be a young man and two ladies that would be there that Saturday morning. I was standing by the side of Gordon Bailey on the elevator when he come and told me that about half past seven in the morning, and he said I could make some money off this man. Gordon Bailey and me was on the elevator together. He could hear what Mr. Frank was saying. I got through cleaning at about a quarter after two and stayed at the door. It was open, and the ladies came about half past two or three o'clock, and the young man came in and says: 'Mr. Frank put you wise?' 'Didn't he tell you to watch the door, two ladies and a young man would be there?' He said: 'Well, I'm the one.' Then he come and told the ladies to come on, and they went up stairs towards the clock; they stayed there about two hours. I didn't know either of the ladies. I don't know what they had on. The man was tall, slim built, heavy man; he didn't work there. I seen him talking to Mr. Holloway frequently during the week. That's the last time I watched for him. Snowball and I were in the box room when he told me to watch for him that time. I don't know if he knew Snowball was there or not. The day before Thanksgiving, when he talked to Snowball, we were on the elevator. Snowball could have heard anything that was said; Mr. Frank saw Snowball standing there. . . . Miss Daisy Hopkins worked at the factory from June, 1912, until Christmas. I worked on the same floor with her. I am sure she worked there from June until about Christmas. She was a low lady, kind of heavy; she was pretty, chunky, kind of heavy weight. I remember that she was there in June because I took a note to Mr. Herbert Schiff which she gave me. Mr. Schiff said it had June on it, when he read it. It was on the outside of the note. I looked and seen something on it; I don't know what it was. It was on the back of the note—June something, and he laughed at it. I know

Miss Daisy Hopkins left at Christmas, because Mr. Dalton told me that she wasn't coming back. It was one Saturday. Mr. Dalton was a slim looking man and tall, with thick eye lashes, black hair, light complected, weighed about 135 pounds, about thirty-five years old. I seen him around the factory several times. The first time was somewhere along in July, when he come in there with a lady. About two weeks after that, I met him at the door, about the last of August. The next time was just about Thanksgiving Day. Then I saw him after Christmas when he come there with a lady. Him and the lady was down in the basement. I don't know who she was. Last time I saw him was down at the station house. The detectives brought him down there. First Saturday I watched for Mr. Frank, I saw Mr. Holloway there; he left about half past two. I saw Mr. Darley that morning; don't know what time he left. The next Saturday I watched Mr. Holloway wasn't there; he was sick. That was about the last of July or first of August. The next time I watched, about the last of August, I saw Mr. Holloway. He left about two o'clock. The day I watched for him in September, after Thanksgiving Day, I saw Mr. Holloway leave about half past two. Schiff and Darley were there. I disremember who I saw there in January, except Mr. Holloway. Sometimes some of the girls worked there on Saturdays. Don't remember any girls that worked there on the first Saturday that I watched. The second time I watched, I think some ladies were working up on the fourth floor. I don't know about the third time, and I don't know whether anybody was working there Thanksgiving afternoon or not. I didn't see Mr. Schiff at all that day. I will swear he wasn't in Mr. Frank's office that day. I don't remember whether any ladies worked there the other times I was watching, or not. . . . I don't know whether I told them (detectives) about watching for Frank at that time. I haven't got any opinion about it. I haven't got any recollection. He told me about stamping and whistling on Thanksgiving Day, but didn't do it until I set then on the box."

Conley had testified both on direct and had been cross examined for a day and a half on other subjects, as above set out, and while on the stand and after testifying as above set out, counsel for defendant moved to rule out, exclude and withdraw each and every part of the evidence given by the witness as to all transactions had between Frank and other women at other times than on the day of the alleged murder, upon the grounds, made at the time, that evidence of such transactions was irrelevant, immaterial, illegal, prejudicial, and dealt with other matters and things irrelevant to and disconnected with the issues on trial, and the same amounted to accusing the defendant of other and independent crimes.

The evidence next above set out was, and is, all the evidence given by Conley dealing with Frank's transactions with women at other times than on the day of the murder, and was the evidence sought to be ruled out, excluded, and withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.

The Court declined, upon the motion made and for the reasons argued, to rule out, exclude and withdraw such evidence from the jury but left the jury free to consider the same.

The ruling of the Court was, and is, erroneous, for the reasons alleged above, and the Court erred in not granting the order asked, ruling out, excluding, and withdrawing such evidence from the jury.



When the solicitor first sought from the witness Conley the evidence here sought to be excluded the defendant objected because the evidence sought to be brought out would be immaterial. The Court ruled that such evidence would be immaterial, but after this ruling the solicitor brought out the direct testimony here sought to be ruled out and excluded. After the direct testimony supra had been brought out after the Court's ruling, the cross testimony supra here sought to be withdrawn was also brought out in an effort to modify or explain the direct evidence. Under the circumstances the Court ought to have granted the motion to exclude and withdraw all such evidence and for failing to do so committed error.

Movant assigns as error the action of the Court in allowing this evidence to go before the jury because the same was illegal, irrelevant, immaterial and hurtful to the defendant.

15. Because the Court permitted, over the objection of defendant's counsel made when the evidence was offered, that such evidence was irrelevant and immaterial, the witness Conley to swear that the police officers took him down to the jail, and to the door where Frank was, but that he never saw Frank at jail and had no conversation with him there.

The Court erred in permitting the introduction of this evidence, for the reasons above stated. It was hurtful for the reason that the solicitor contended, in his address to the jury, that Frank declined to see Conley, and that such declination was evidence of his guilt.

16. Because the Court, over objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, and not binding on Frank, permitted the witness, Mrs. White, to testify that Arthur White, her husband, and Campbell are both connected with the Pencil Company, and that she never reported seeing the negro on April 26th, 1913, which she testified she did see, in the pencil factory, to the City detectives until May the 7th, 1913.

For the reasons above stated, the Court erred in not excluding the evidence, and for the reason that the solicitor, in his address to the jury, contended that the fact that there was a negro (which he contended was Conley) in the factory the morning of April 26th was concealed from the authorities, and that such concealment was evidence of Frank's guilt.

17. Because the Court permitted, over the objection of defendant's counsel made when the same was offered, that the same was irrelevant and immaterial, the witness Mangum, to testify that Conley and another party went down from the pencil factory to the jail, that he had a conversation with Mr. Frank about confronting Conley, Frank then being on the fourth floor of the jail; that Chief Beavers, Chief Lanford, and Mr. Scott, with Conley, came to the jail to see Frank, and they asked him if they could see him; that he said: "I will go and see; and, if he is willing, it is all right;" that he went to Frank

and said: "Mr. Frank, Chief Beavers, Chief Lanford and Scott and Conley want to talk with you, if you want to see them;" that Frank said: "No, my attorney is not here, and I have got nobody to defend me;" that his lawyer was not there, and that no one was there to listen to what might be said.

The Court erred in admitting this evidence for the reasons above stated.

The solicitor in his argument pressed on the jury that the failure of Frank to face this negro and the detectives was evidence of guilt, and movant contends same was prejudicial.

18. Because the Court erred in permitting the witness, Dr. H. F. Harris, over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the testimony was offered that the same was irrelevant and immaterial, to testify:

"I might preface my remarks on this by saying that more than 12 or 15 years ago someone told me that the reason that cabbage was considered indigestible was because they were ordinarily cooked with meat or grease, and with the idea of settling this question, on my clinic I got a lot of patients whose stomachs were not in very good condition, and made a number of experiments particularly to determine the matter as to whether or not this was the case. During the course of the experiment that I made at that time, I was struck by the fact that the behaviour of the stomach after taking a small meal of cabbage and bread, either cornbread or biscuit,—that the behaviour of the stomach was practically the same as after taking some biscuit and some water alone.

"I discovered, as I say, at that time, that our ideas about how quickly cabbage digested were rather erroneous, and as I remarked a moment ago, I observed that the stomach freed itself of a mixture of cabbage and bread just about as quickly as we only gave bread alone; the amount of recovery on the part of the mucuous membrane in the way of sufficient gastric juices was about the same practically or probably a little bit more recovery with cabbage.

"It is the only way I can get at it, it is the only real knowledge I have on the subject in connection with the work that was done in this particular instance here."

The witness Harris testified that from the state of digestion of the food found in the stomach of Mary Phagan he could say she died in 30 or 40 minutes after her last meal of bread and cabbage, over the objection above made and the further objection that the witness could not give the result of other and different experiments made 12 or 15 years ago upon persons "whose stomachs were not in a very good condition," and not under the same circumstances and conditions, to sustain and bolster up the experiment made upon the stomach of Mary Phagan, and to sustain his assertion that Mary Phagan died from 30 to 40 minutes after she ate her last meal.

The Court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony and in doing so, the court for the reasons indicated, committed prejudicial error.

19. Because the court erred in permitting the witness, Dr. H. F. Harris, to testify, over the objection of the defendant made when the evidence was submitted, that the same was irrelevant and immaterial and that experts could

not give to sustain their opinions individual and isolated experiments but must answer from their knowledge of the science obtained from all sources, that . . .

"Knowing the facts that cabbage would pass out of the stomach very quickly in a normal one, I ascertained her digestion, and as soon as I saw the cabbage in this case, I at once felt certain that this girl either came to her death or possibly the blow on her head at any rate, a very short time, perhaps three quarters of an hour or half an hour or forty minutes, or something like that, before death occurred. I then began a number of experiments with some gentlemen who had normal stomachs with a view of judging of the time.

"I had the mother of the girl to cook some cabbage, and it was given to people with absolutely normal stomachs; that I know from investigations of their stomachs.

"I will state in general terms there were only four persons experimented upon, and two of them were experimented upon twice in this connection, and in every single instance the effect on the cabbage was practically the same, that is, it was almost entirely digested, notwithstanding the fact that I had those men given some pieces just as large as were found in Mary Phagan's stomach, and I took pains to see to it that they did not chew this cabbage, but they ate it very rapidly, in three or four minutes, gulped it down, so that we would have as nearly as possible the conditions that I was certain existed at the time Mary Phagan ate her last meal. The result of this, you gentlemen have seen."

(The witness here was permitted over the objection as above stated, to exhibit several small glass jars containing what purported to be partly digested cabbage, resulting from experiments made.)

"Now I know from my observations of the cases that I present here that the digestion of these persons was normal. I did not make a microscopic examination of the stomachs of the gentlemen experimented upon, but I made an examination of their stomachs to see how they secrete their food, which is the only way we can tell. You can take the fluids and tell whether the stomach is normal, it is the only way we possess.

"I merely wish to call attention to the fact that I made experiments which varied in the time that the contents were in the person's stomach, from 38 minutes, which was the time the contents were in the stomach of the boy 14 years of age, to 70 minutes, in another one of my cases, and the results indicated in every instance, from 38 to 70 minutes, in every single instance, the cabbage was practically digested, practically altogether so."

Over objections made as is above stated, the Court permitted this testimony to go to the jury and in doing so committed prejudicial error. Experts can testify from the given state of any science, but can not explain the process or results of particular experiments made by themselves.

20. Because the Court permitted the witness Harris to testify as follows:

"I wish to say that I made a microscopic examination of those contents of the stomachs, and while I found in Mary Phagan's case, except in the case of particles of cabbage that were chewed up too small to give sufficient indication, the cabbage that was in the stomach gives every indication of having been introduced into it within three quarters of an hour; the microscopic



examination showed plainly that it had not begun to dissolve, or at least, only a very slight degree, and it indicated that the process of digestion had not gone on to any extent at the time this girl was rendered unconscious at any rate. I wish further to state that on examining Mary Phagan's stomach I found that the starch she had eaten had undergone practically no alteration; there were a few of the starch cells which showed the beginning of the process of digestion, having changed into the substance called erthro-dextrine, but these were very much rarer than is the case in a normal stomach where the contents are exposed to the actions of the digestive fluids for something like, say 50 or 60 minutes. The contents taken from the little girl's stomach were examined chemically, and the result of the chemical examination showed that there were only slight traces of the first action of the digestive juices on the starch, thus confirming my microscopic examination, and showed clearly that only the very beginning of digestion had proceeded in this case.

"As I was saying, of even greater importance in this matter, it was found that there were 160 cubical solids, or about five and a half ounces of total contents remaining in the stomach, and after an ordinary meal of cabbage and bread, this is not the case. Under ordinary conditions, we get out perhaps on an average of something like anywhere from 50 to 60 or 70 cubic centimeters, or, say from a half to a third of what was found in this case, and it was plainly evident that none of this material had gone into the small intestine, because that was examined for it from the mouth out to the beginning of the large intestine, which is many feet away from it in the neighborhood of something like 25 feet away, and there was very, very little food found in the small intestine, none at all, as a fact, in the small intestine, which showed clearly, as I have said, that the contents of the stomach had not begun to be pushed on into the small intestine at the time that death occurred. This pushing on begins in about half an hour after such a meal as this, and by the time an hour is reached, the greater part of what is introduced into the stomach is already down in the small intestine, so that it becomes very clear from this that digestion had not proceeded to any extent at all."

The above testimony of Dr. Harris was objected to when offered because the same was argumentative. It was not, as movant contends, a statement of fact, scientific or otherwise, from which the jury could for themselves draw conclusions, but was a mixture of facts and arguments.

The Court declined to rule out this testimony, and declined to force the witness to abstain from arguments and state the facts. This argument of the witness was clearly prejudicial to the defendant and failure to rule out the testimony was error.

21. Because, the Court permitted the witness C. B. Dalton to testify over the objection of defendant, made when the evidence was offered and before cross examination, that the testimony was irrelevant, incompetent, immaterial and illegal, dealt with other matters than the issues on trial and was prejudicial to the defendant's case; that he knew Leo Frank, visited the National Pencil Co.'s plant and saw Frank there four or five times; that he was in the office of Leo Frank, that he has been there three or four times with Miss Daisy Hopkins, and at these times Frank was in his office; that the witness had been in the basement, going down the ladder, that Frank knew he was in the building, but does not know whether Frank knew he was



in the basement; that he saw Conley there when he went there; that sometimes when he saw him in his office there would be ladies there, sometimes there would be two and sometimes one; he did not know how often he saw Conley there, but sometimes he would give him a quarter, that he did that a half dozen or more times; that he went to the factory about once a week for a half dozen weeks, that he saw Frank there in the evenings and in the day times; sometimes he would see cold drinks in the office, Coca-Cola, lemon limes, etc., that sometimes he saw beer in the office, that he never saw ladies there when beer and cold drinks were there do anything and never saw them do any writing.

The Court permitted this testimony of Dalton to be heard over the objections made as aforesaid and for such reason committed error.

This evidence was peculiarly prejudicial to the defendant because the solicitor insisted, in his argument, that in addition to being independent testimony looking to the same end, that it corroborated the testimony of Conley as to immoral conduct on the part of Frank.

22. Because the Court permitted the witness C. B. Dalton to be asked the following questions and make the following answers, over the objection of the defendant made at the time the evidence was offered, and before cross examination, that the testimony was irrelevant, incompetent, immaterial, and illegal, dealt with other matters and things than the issues of the trial, was prejudicial to the defendant.

Q. Mr. Dalton, have you ever worked at the pencil factory?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know Leo M. Frank?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know Daisy Hopkins?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know Jim Conley?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you ever visited the National Pencil Factory?

A. Yes, sir; I have been there some.

Q. How many times?

A. I don't know; three, or four, or five times.

Q. Were you ever in the office of Leo M. Frank?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On what occasion?

A. I have been there two or three times with Miss Daisy.

Q. Where was Frank when you were there?

A. He was in the office; I don't know whose office it was, but he was in the office.

Q. Were you ever down in the basement?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What part of the basement did you visit? Can you tell me on that diagram (indicating)?

A. I have been down that ladder.

Q. (Looked at No. 12). Did Frank have any knowledge of your business down there?

A. I don't know; he knowed I was in the basement; he knowed I was there.

Q. Was Conley there when you were there?

A. Yes, sir; I seen Conley there, and the night-watchman, too—he wasn't Conley.

Q. At the time you saw Frank there was anybody else in the office with him?

A. Yes, sir; there would be some ladies there; sometimes two and sometimes one, maybe they didn't work in the morning and would be there in the evening.

Q. How many times did you pay Jim Conley anything?

A. I don't know.

Q. About?

A. Gave him a quarter when I was going in sometimes; I expect I gave him a half dozen or more—about every week.

Q. What time of day or night was it that you saw Mr. Frank in his office?

A. It was in the evening—in the day time, sorter.

Q. What, if anything, would he have up there at the time?

A. Sometimes he would have cool drinks.

Q. What kind of drinks?

A. Coca-Cola, lemon lime, or something of that sort.

Q. What else?

A. Some beer, sometimes.

Q. Some beer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were those ladies doing any stenographic work up there?

A. I never seed them doing any writing. I never stayed there long, but I never seed them doing any writing.

Q. You never saw anything of that kind going on?

A. No, sir.

The Court permitted these questions and answers to be heard by the jury, over the objection of the defendant, aforesaid, and committed error, for the reasons aforesaid. His evidence was particularly prejudicial to the defendant, because the solicitor insisted in his argument that it corroborated the testimony of Conley as to immoral conduct on the part of Frank.

The Court erred for the reasons above stated in not ruling out and excluding from the jury each and all of the above questions and answers.

23. Because the Court permitted, over the defendant's objection, made when the testimony was offered, that it was illegal, immaterial, and because it could not be binding on the defendant, the witness S. L. Rosser, to testify that since April 26, 1913, he had been engaged in connection with this case; that he visited Mrs. Arthur White subsequent to April 26; that the first time the witness ever claimed to have seen the negro at the factory when she went into the factory on April 26th, was some time about the 6th or 7th of May.

The Court, over objections as stated, admitted the testimony just above, and in doing so erred, for the reasons herein stated.

This was particularly prejudicial to the defendant, because the solicitor contended in his argument to the jury that the fact that factory employees

did not disclose the fact that Mrs. White saw the negro on April 26th, was evidence that the defendant was seeking to suppress testimony material to the discovery of the murderer.

24. Because, during the trial, and on August 6, 1913, pending the motion of defendant's counsel to rule out the testimony of the witness Conley tending to show acts of perversion on the part of the defendant and acts of immorality wholly disconnected with and disassociated from this crime. (Such evidence being set out and described in grounds 13 and 14 of this motion.)

The Court declined to rule out said testimony, and immediately upon the statement of the Court that he would let such testimony remain in evidence before the jury, there was instant, pronounced and continuous applause throughout the crowded court room wherein the trial was being had, by clapping of hands and by stamping of feet upon the floor.

The jury was not then in the same room wherein the trial was being had, but in an adjacent room not more than fifty feet from where the judge was sitting and not more than fifteen or twenty feet from portions of the crowd applauding, and so close to the crowd, in the opinion of the Court, as to probably hear the applauding.

Immediately upon said applauding the defendant's counsel moved the Court for a mistrial of the cause; and, upon the announcement of the Court that he would not grant a mistrial, moved the Court to clear the Court-room, so that other demonstrations could not be had.

The Court refused to grant a mistrial and declined to clear the court-room.

In refusing a mistrial and in declining to clear the court-room, the Court erred. The passion and prejudice of those in the crowded court-room were so much aroused against the defendant, as contended by counsel for the defendant, that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial.

The Court, as movant contends, also erred in not clearing the court-room of the disorderly crowd, but left them in the court-room, where their very presence was a menace to the jury.

It is true that the Court did threaten that upon a repetition of such disorder he would clear the court-room, but such a threat, as movant contends, was wholly inadequate, as evidenced by the fact that during the same day of the trial, while the witness Harris was upon the stand, the crowd laughed jeeringly when Mr. Arnold, one of the defendant's counsel, objected to a comment of the solicitor, and that, too, in the presence of the jury.

And again, during the trial, when Mr. Arnold, one of the defendant's counsel, objected to a question asked, the following colloquy took place:

Mr. Arnold: "I object to that your Honor; that is, entering the orders on that book merely; that is not the question he is asking now at all.

The Court: "What is the question he is asking now?" (Referring to questions asked by the Solicitor-General.)

Mr. Arnold: "He is asking how long it took to do all this work connected with it." (Referring to work done by Frank the day of the murder.)



The Court: "Well, he knows what he is asking him."

Upon this suggestion of the Court, that the Solicitor knew what he was doing, the spectators in the court-room applauded, creating quite a demonstration.

Mr. Arnold again complained of the conduct of the spectators in the court-room. The Court gave no relief, except directing the Sheriff to find out who was making the noise, to which the Sheriff replied that he could maintain order only by clearing the court-room.

25. Because the Court erred in admitting, over the defendant's objection, made at the time the testimony was offered, that it was illegal, immaterial and irrelevant, the introduction of certain glass bottles containing partly digested cabbage, which resulted from tests made on other parties by the witness, Dr. Harris, wherein the cabbage which he claimed to be cooked the same as was the cabbage eaten by Mary Phagan, after it had remained in the stomach of such other parties from 30 to 50 minutes were taken out by means of a stomach pump.

The purpose of these experiments was to show the state of digestion of this cabbage in comparison with the state of digestion of the cabbage taken from the stomach of Mary Phagan, so as to sustain the contention of the State that Mary Phagan was killed within 30 or 40 minutes after eating the cabbage and bread.

The Court admitted these samples of partly digested cabbage taken from the stomach of others, as aforesaid, and in doing so, committed error for the reasons above stated, and for the further reason that there was no evidence, as the defendant's counsel contend, that the same circumstances and conditions surrounded these other parties in the eating and digestion of the cabbage as surrounded Mary Phagan in the eating and digestion on her part and no evidence that the stomachs of these other parties were in the same condition as was Mary Phagan's.

26. Because the Court, in permitting the witness, Harry Scott, to testify over the objection of defendant, made at the time the testimony was offered, that same was irrelevant, immaterial and not binding upon the defendant, that he did not get any information from anyone connected with the National Pencil Company that the negro Conley could write, but that he got his information as to that from entirely outside sources, and wholly disconnected with the National Pencil Company.

The Court permitted this testimony to be given over the objections above stated, and in doing so, for the reasons therein stated, committed error.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because the negro Conley at first denied his ability to write and the discovery that he could write was as the State contended, the first step towards connecting Conley with the crime, and the Solicitor contended in his argument to the jury that the fact that the Pencil Company authorities knew Conley could write and did not disclose



that to the State authorities; was a circumstance going to show the guilt of Frank.

27. Because the Court permitted the witness, Harry Scott, to testify over the objection of defendant's counsel, made when the testimony was offered, that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, illegal and not binding on the defendant, that the witness first communicated Mrs. White's statements about seeing a negro on the street floor of the pencil factory on April 26, 1913, to Black, Chief Lanford, and Bass Rosser, that the information was given to the detectives on April 28th.

The Court, over the defendant's objections, permitted the above testimony to be given, and in doing so erred for the reasons above stated. This was prejudicial to the defendant, because it was contended by the State that this witness, Harry Scott, who was one of the Pinkerton detectives who had been employed to ferret out the crime, by Frank acting for the National Pencil Company, had not promptly informed the officials about the fact of Mrs. White's seeing this negro and that such failure was evidence pointing to the guilt of Frank.

This witness was one of the investigators for the Pinkerton Detective Agency, who was employed by Frank acting for the National Pencil Company to ferret out this crime.

28. Because the Court permitted Harry Scott, a witness for the State, to testify over the objection of the defendant, made at the time that same was offered, that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant; that the witness, in company with Jim Conley, went to the jail and made an effort to see Frank. And that after Conley made his last statement (the statement about writing the notes on Saturday) Chief Beavers, Chief Lanford and the witness went to the jail for the purpose of confronting Frank. That Conley went with them; that they saw the Sheriff and explained their mission to him and the Sheriff went to Frank's cell; that the witness saw Frank at the jail on May 3rd (Saturday), and that Frank refused to see Conley only through Sheriff Mangum; that was all.

The Court, in admitting this testimony over the objections made, erred for the reasons stated above. This was error prejudicial to the defendant, because the witness Mangum, over the defendant's objection, had already been allowed to testify that Frank declined to see Chief Lanford, Chief Beavers, the witness and Conley, except with the consent of his counsel or with his counsel; and the Solicitor in his argument asserted that the failure of Frank to see the witness while he was employed by the Pencil Company to ferret out the crime in the presence of the negro and the two chiefs, was strong evidence of his guilt.

29. Because J. M. Minar, a newspaper reporter for the Atlanta Georgian, was called by the defendant for the purpose of impeaching the witness George

Epps who claimed that on Saturday of the crime he accompanied Mary Phagan from a point on Bellwood Avenue to the center of the city of Atlanta, by showing that on April 27th at the house of Epps, he asked George, together with his sister, when was the last time they saw Mary Phagan. In reply, the sister of Epps said she had seen Epps on the previous Thursday, but the witness Epps said nothing about having come to town with Mary Phagan the day of the murder but did say he had ridden to town with her in the mornings of other days occasionally.

Upon cross examination, over the objection of defendant's counsel made when the cross examination was offered, that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent, prejudicial to the defendant, and not binding on the defendant, the witness was allowed to testify that he went to the house of Epps in his capacity of reporter; that one Clofine was the City Editor and that the witness was under him and that Clofine was a constant visitor of Frank at the jail.

The Court admitted this testimony over the objections aforesaid and in doing so erred. There was no evidence of any relationship between Frank and Clofine which could show any prejudice or bias in Frank's favor, even by Clofine and certainly none on the part of the witness Miner.

30. Because the Court erred in permitting the witness Schiff, to testify over the objection of defendant made at the time the testimony was offered, that the same was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, that it was not Frank's custom to make engagements Friday for Saturday evening, then go off and leave the financial sheet that had to be over at Montag's Monday morning not touched.

The Court permitted this testimony over the objection of defendant and therein erred, for the reasons stated.

This was prejudicial, because it was the contention of the State that Frank, contrary to his usual custom, made an engagement on Friday before the crime to go to the baseball game on Saturday afternoon, leaving the financial sheet unfinished, although such sheet ought to have been prepared on Saturday and sent to Montag's to the general manager of the factory on Monday. The only material issue was what took place Friday and Saturday and it was wholly immaterial as to what his custom previous to that time had been.

31. Because, during the trial the following colloquy took place between the Solicitor and the witness Schiff:

Q. Isn't the dressing room back behind these doors?

A. Yes, it is behind these doors.

Q. That is the fastening of that door, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And isn't the dressing room back there then?

A. That isn't the way it is situated.

Q. It isn't the way it is situated?

A. It is not, no, sir.

Q. Why, Mr. Schiff, if this is the door right here and—

A. Mr. Dorsey I know that factory.

Q. Well, I am trying to get you to tell us if you know it; you have no objection to telling it, have you?

(Here objection was made by defendant's counsel that Schiff had shown no objection to answering the questions of the Solicitor and that such questions as the one next above, which indicated that the witness did object to answering was improper.)

Mr. Dorsey: I have got a right to show the feeling.

The Court: Go on, now, and put your questions.

Mr. Dorsey: Have you any objections to answering the question, Mr. Witness?

A. No, sir; I have not.

These comments of the Solicitor, reflecting upon the witness were objected to and the Court urged to prevent such reflections. This the Court declined to do and allowed the Solicitor to repeat the insinuation that the witness was objecting to answering him.

This was prejudicial error. The witness deserved no such insinuations as were made by the Solicitor and in the absence of the requested relief by the Court, the jury was left to believe that the reflections of the Solicitor were just.

This witness was one of the main leading witnesses for the defendant, and to allow him, movant contends, to be thus unjustly discredited was harmful to the defendant.

32. Because the Court erred in declining to allow the witness Miss Hall to testify that on the morning of April 26th, and before the murder was committed, Mr. Frank called her over the telephone, asking her to come to the pencil factory to do stenographic work, stating at the time he called her that he had so much work to do that it would take him until six o'clock to get it done.

The defendant contends that this testimony was part of the res gestae and ought to have been heard by the Court, and failure to do so committed error.

33. Because, while Philip Chambers, a youth of 15 years of age, and a witness for the defendant, was testifying, the following occurred:

Q. You and Frank were pretty good friends, weren't you?

A. Well, just like a boss ought to be to me.

Q. What was it that Frank tried to get you to do that you told Gantt about several times?

A. I never did complain to Mr. Gantt.

Q. What proposition was it that Mr. Frank made to you and told you he was going to turn you off if you didn't do what he wanted you to?

A. He never made any proposition to me.

Q. Do you deny that you talked to Mr. Gantt and told him about these improper proposals that Frank would make to you and told you that he was going to turn you off unless you did what he wanted you to do?

A. I never did tell Gantt anything of the sort.



(Objection was here made by the defendant that the answer sought would be immaterial.)

The Court: Well, I don't know what it is, ask him the question.

Q. Didn't you tell Gantt the reason why Frank said he was going to turn you off?

A. No, sir.

Q. Didn't Frank tell you he was going to turn you off unless you would permit him to do with you what he wanted to do?

A. No, sir.

Q. No such conversation ever occurred?

A. No, sir.

Q. With J. M. Gantt, the man who was bookkeeper and was turned off there?

A. No, sir, I never told him any such thing.

Q. No such thing ever happened?

A. No, sir.

Mr. Arnold: Before the examination progresses any further, I want to move to rule out the witness said there wasn't any truth in it, but I want to move to rule out the questions and answers in relation to what he said Frank proposed to do to him—right now. I think it is grossly improper and grossly immaterial; the witness says there is no truth in it, but I move to rule it out.

Mr. Dorsey: We are entitled to show the relations existing between this witness and the defendant, your Honor.

Mr. Arnold: We move to rule out as immaterial, illegal and grossly prejudicial and as grossly improper, and the gentleman knows it, or ought to know it, the testimony that I have called your Honor's attention to.

The Court: Well, what do you say to that, Mr. Dorsey? How is this relevant at all over objection?

Mr. Dorsey: We are always entitled to show the connection, the association, the friendship or lack of friendship, the prejudice, bias, or lack of prejudice and bias, of the witness, your Honor. You permitted them, with Conley, to go into all kinds of proposals to test his memory and to test his disposition to tell the truth, etc. Now I want to lay the foundation for the impeachment of this witness by this man Gantt to whom he did make these complaints.

The Court: Well, I rule it all out.

Mr. Arnold: It is the most unfair thing I have ever heard of, to try to inject in here in this illegal way, this kind of evidence; any man ought to know that it is illegal. It has no probative value, and has been brought in here by this miserable negro and I don't think any sane man on earth could believe it. It is vile slander and fatigues the indignation to sit here and hear things like this suggested, things that your Honor and everybody knows are incompetent.

The Court: Well, I sustain your objection.

Mr. Arnold: If the effort is made again, your Honor, I am going to move for a mistrial. No man can get a fair trial with such inuendoes and insinuations as these made against him.

The Court: Have you any further questions, Mr. Dorsey?

Mr. Dorsey: That is all I wanted to ask him. I will bring Gantt in to impeach him.

The Court: Well, I have ruled that all out.

Mr. Dorsey: Well, we will let your Honor rule on Gantt, too.

The assertion by the solicitor that this witness did make the suggested complaints to Gantt, the insinuations involved in the questions of the solicitor



that Frank had committed disgraceful and prejudicial acts with the witness and the final assertion of the solicitor when the Court ruled it out that he would introduce Gantt and let the Court rule on Gantt too, was highly prejudicial to the defendant. The Court erred in permitting the solicitor to make the insinuations and to indulge in the threat that he would let the Court rule on Gantt too, in the presence of the jury and without any rebuke on the part of the Court. The Court erred in not formally withdrawing these insinuations and assertions from the jury and in not of his own motion severely rebuking the solicitor for his conduct. The mere ruling out of the testimony was not sufficient. Nothing but a severe rebuke to the Solicitor-General would have taken from the jury the sting of the insinuations and threats of the solicitor.

34. Because, while Mrs. Freeman was on the stand, after testifying as to other things she testified that while she and Miss Hall, on April 26th, were at the restaurant immediately contiguous to the pencil factory, and after they had left the factory at 11:45 o'clock, a. m., and had had lunch, that Lemmie Quinn came in and stated that he had just been up to see Mr. Frank.

Upon motion of the solicitor this statement that he had been up to see Mr. Frank was ruled out, as hearsay.

This statement of Lemmie Quinn was a part of the res gestae and was not hearsay evidence and was material to the defendant's cause. Lemmie Quinn testified that he saw Mr. Frank in his office just before he went down to the restaurant and had the conversation with Mrs. Freeman and Miss Hall; this testimony was strongly disputed by the solicitor. Lemmie Quinn's statement that he was in Frank's office just before going into the restaurant was of the greatest moment to the defendant, because it strongly tended to dispute the contention of the State that Mary Phagan was killed between twelve and half past.

The Court erred in ruling out and declining to hear this, for the reasons above stated. The testimony was relevant, material, and part of the res gestae, and should have been sent to the jury.

35. Because the Court permitted, at the instance of the Solicitor-General, the witness Sig Montag to testify over the objection of the defendant, made when same was offered, that same was irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent; that the National Pencil Company employed the Pinkertons; that the Pinkertons have not been paid, but have sent in their bills; that they sent them in two or three times; that, otherwise, no request has been made for payment, and that Pierce, of the Pinkerton Agency, has not asked the witness for pay.

In permitting this testimony to go to the jury, over the objections above stated, the Court erred.

The introduction of this evidence was prejudicial to the defendant, for the reason that the solicitor contended that the pay due the Pinkertons by the Pencil Company was withheld for the purpose of affecting the testimony of the agents of that company.

36. Because the Court permitted, at the instance of the solicitor the witness Sig Montag, to testify over the objection of defendant, made at the time the testimony was offered that same was irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent, that he got the reports made on the crime by the Pinkertons and that they were made. That these reports came sometimes every day and then they did not come for a few days and then came again. That he practically got every day's report; that he got the report about finding the big stick and about the finding of the envelope, that he got them pretty close after they were made; that he knew about them having the stick and the envelope when he read the report. That he did not request Mr. Pierce, representing the Pinkertons, to keep from the police and the authorities the finding of the stick and the envelope.

The Court, over the objections of the defendant, on the grounds stated, permitted this testimony to go to the jury and in doing so erred.

This was prejudicial to the defendant because the solicitor insisted that the finding of the envelope and stick were concealed from the authorities.

37. Because the Court erred in permitting the witness Leech, a street car inspector, at the instance of the solicitor and over the objections of the defendant that same was irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent, to testify that he had seen street car men come in ahead of their schedule time. That he had seen that often and had seen it last week. That he, Leech, had suspended a man last week for running as much as six minutes ahead of time. That he suspends them pretty well every week and that he suspends a man for being six minutes ahead of time just like he would for being six minutes late. It frequently happens that a street car crew comes in ahead of time and that they are given demerits for it and that he sometimes suspends them for it. That the street car crews are relieved in the center of town; that sometimes a crew is caught ahead of time when they are going to be relieved. That it is not a matter of impossibility to keep the men from getting ahead of time, although that does happen almost every day. That there are some lines on which the crew does not come in ahead of time because they can not get in. It frequently happens that the English Avenue car cuts off the River car and the Marietta car. It often happens that these cars are cut off. That when there is a procession or anything moving through town, it makes the crew anxious to get through town, that they are punished just as much for coming in ahead of time even a day like that as they would be any other day. They do their best to keep the schedule, but in spite of it they sometimes get off.

The Court permitted the testimony of the witness Leech over the objection of the defendant that the same was irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent, and in doing so committed error.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because the crew on the English Avenue car upon which the little girl, Mary Phagan, came to town, testified that she got on their car at ten minutes to twelve. That under their schedule they should reach the corner of Broad and Marietta Streets at 7½ minutes

past twelve. That they were on their schedule time on April 26th and did reach that place at 12:07 or 12:07½. What other crews did at other times or even what this crew did on other occasions was wholly immaterial and in no way illustrated just what took place on the trip wherein Mary Phagan came to town. That other crews often came in ahead of time or that this particular crew often came in ahead of time was wholly immaterial.

38. Because during the examination by Mr. Arnold, counsel for the defendant, of V. H. Kreigshaber, a witness for the defendant, there was laughter in the audience, sufficiently generally distributed throughout the audience and loud enough to interfere with the examination. The testimony elicited from Kreigshaber was that Frank was a young man, and that Kreigshaber was older, but he didn't know how much older. Mr. Arnold called the Court's attention to the interruption for the purpose of obtaining some action from the Court thereon.

The Court stated that if there was other disorder no one would be permitted in the court room on the following day and requested the Sheriff to maintain order.

The defendant says that the Court erred in not then taking radical steps to preserve order in the court room and to permit the trial to proceed orderly and that a threat to clear the court room upon the following day and the request for the Sheriff to keep order was not sufficient for the purpose.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because the laughter was directly in derision of the defendant's defense being made by his counsel.

39. Because the Court permitted, at the instance of the Solicitor, the witness Milton Klein to testify, over the objection of the defendant, made when the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, as follows:

"When the witness Conley was brought to the jail Mr. Roberts came to the cell and wanted Frank to see Conley. I sent word through Mr. Roberts that Frank didn't care to see him. Mr. Frank knew that the detectives were down there and afterwards they brought Conley up there and of course Mr. Frank knew he was there. I knew and Mr. Frank knew he was there. Mr. Frank was at one side and I acted as spokesman. Mr. Frank would not see any of the city detectives. Frank gave as his reason for refusing to see Conley with the detectives that he would see him only with the consent of Mr. Rosser, his attorney. I do not know whether Mr. Frank sent and got Mr. Rosser or not. I told the detectives about sending and getting Mr. Rosser's consent. I think Mr. Goldstein was there and Scott and Black and a half-dozen detectives, a whole bunch of them. I was there only once when Conley was there, that was the time when Conley swore he wrote the notes on Friday. When Conley came up there with the detectives, Frank's manner, bearing and deportment were natural. He considered Conley in the same light he considered any other of the city detectives. I know that because I conferred with him about it and he said he would not see any of the city detectives without the consent of Mr. Rosser; he considered Scott as working for the city at that time. I sent word that he would not receive any of the city detectives, Black or anyone of the rest of them. Frank considered Scott with the rest of them, including him with the city detectives. He would



not see anyone of the city detectives and that included Scott. Frank did not tell me that, the inference was mine. Frank merely said he would receive none of the city detectives without Mr. Rosser's consent, that was the substance of his conversation. Mr. Roberts came up and announced the city detectives; this was at Frank's cell in the county jail."

The Court permitted this testimony to go to the jury over the objections made as above stated, and in doing so committed error.

This was especially prejudicial to the defendant, because the Solicitor, in his argument to the jury stressed and urged upon the jury that this failure of the defendant to, as he expressed it, face this negro Conley and the detectives, even in the absence of his own counsel, was evidence of guilt.

40. Because the Court permitted Miss Mary Pirk to be asked the following questions and to make the following answers on cross examination made by the Solicitor:

Q. You never heard of a single thing immoral during that five years—that's true? (Referring to the time she worked at the pencil factory.)

A. Yes, sir, that's true.

Q. You never knew of his (Frank's) being guilty of a thing that was immoral during those five years—is that true?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You never heard a single soul during that time discuss it?

A. No, sir.

Q. You have never heard of his going in the dressing rooms there of the girls?

A. No, sir.

Q. You never heard of his slapping them as he would go by?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever see Mr. Frank go back there and take Mary off to one side and talk to her?

A. I never seen it.

Q. That never occurred?

A. I have never seen it.

Q. You never heard about the time that Frank had her off in the corner there, and she was trying to get back to her work?

A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't know about that?

A. No, sir.

Q. That was not discussed?

A. No, sir.

These questions were asked over the objection of the defendant, because even if the Solicitor's questions brought out that the witness had heard charges of immorality against Frank, that her answers thereabout would have been irrelevant and immaterial in this trial of Frank for murder. The fact that Frank might have been frequently guilty of immorality could not be held against him on a trial for the murder of Mary Phagan. Nor, could acts of immorality with women be heard, even on cross examination, as evidence of bad character and reputation, upon Frank's trial for the murder of Mary Phagan. Lasciviousness is not one of the character traits involved in a

case of murder and can not be heard in a murder trial, even when the defendant has put his character in issue.

41. Because the Court permitted the witness W. D. McWorth to testify, at the request of the Solicitor-General, over the objection of the defendant made at the time the testimony was offered, that the same was immaterial.

"Mr. Pierce is the head of the Pinkerton office here. I do not know where he is; the last time I saw him was Monday evening, I do not know where Mr. Whitfield is (Mr. Whitfield was also a Pinkerton man). I saw him the last time Monday afternoon. I do not know whether Pierce and Whitfield are in the city or not."

The Court admitted this testimony over the objections of the defendant, made at the time the testimony was offered, for the reasons stated and in so doing committed error. This was especially prejudicial to the defendant. Pierce and Whitfield were part of the Pinkerton's force in the city of Atlanta and the inference of the solicitor was that he wished their whereabouts to be shown, upon the theory that the Pinkertons were employed by Frank for the National Pencil Company and that a failure on the part of Frank to produce them would be a presumption against him, as he stated it, upon the well-known principle of law that if evidence is shown to be in the possession of a party and not produced, it raises a presumption against them.

42. Because the Court permitted McWorth, at the instance of the Solicitor-General to testify over the objections of the defendant, made when the evidence was offered, that the same was irrelevant, immaterial and illegal:

"I reported it (the finding of the club and envelope) to the police force about 17 hours afterwards. After I reported the finding, I had a further conference with the police about it about four hours afterwards. I told John Black about the envelope and the club. I turned the envelope and club into the possession of H. B. Pierce."

The Court heard this testimony over the objection of the defendant, made as above stated, and in doing so committed error, for the reasons herein stated.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because the Solicitor-General contended that his failure to sooner report the finding of the club and the envelope to the police were circumstances against Frank. These detectives were not employed by Frank, but by Frank for the National Pencil Company, and movant contends that he is not bound by what they did or failed to do. The Court should have so instructed the jury.

43. Because the court permitted the witness Irene Jackson, at the instance of the Solicitor-General and over the objection of the defendant, that the testimony was irrelevant, immaterial, illegal, to testify as follows:

Q. Do you remember having a conversation with Mr. Starnes about something that occurred.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now what was that dressing room incident that you told him about that time?

A. I said she was undressing.

- Q.—Who was undressing?  
A. Ermilie Mayfield, and I came in the room, and while I was in there, Mr. Frank came to the door.
- Q. Mr. Frank came in the door?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. What did he do?  
A. He looked and turned around and walked out.
- Q. Did Mr. Frank open the door?  
A. Yes, he just pushed it open.
- Q. Pushed the door open?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And looked in?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And smiled?  
A. I don't know whether, I never notice to see whether he smiled or not, he just kind of looked at us and turned around and walked out.
- Q. Looked at you, stood there how long?  
A. I didn't time him; he just came and looked and turned and walked out.
- Q. Came in the dressing room?  
A. Just came to the door.
- Q. Came into the door of the dressing room?  
A. Yes.
- Q. How was Miss Ermilie Mayfield dressed at that time?  
A. She had off her top dress, and was holding her old dress in her hand to put it on.
- Q. Now, you reported that to the forelady there?  
A. I did not but Ermilie did.
- Q. Now did you talk or not to anybody or hear of anybody except Miss Ermilie Mayfield talking about Mr. Frank going in the dressing room there when she had some of her clothes off?  
A. I have heard remarks but I don't remember who said them, or anything about it?
- Q. (By Mr. Rosser): Was that before April 26th?  
A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Well, what was said about Mr. Frank going into the room, the dressing room?  
A. I don't remember.
- Q. Well, by whom was it said?  
A. I don't remember.
- Q. Well, how many girls did you hear talking about it?  
A. I don't remember; I just remember I heard something about it two or three different times, but I don't remember anything about it, just a few times.
- Q. Was that said two or three different times?  
A. I said a few times, I said two or three times.
- Q. How would the girls—she said she heard them talking about Mr. Frank going in the dressing room on two or three different occasions—well, you know you heard them discussing about his going in this dressing room on different occasions, two or three different occasions, did you?  
A. Yes.
- Q. That is what you said, wasn't it?  
A. Yes, sir.



- Q. Now when was it that he run in there on Miss Ermilie Mayfield?  
A. It was the middle of the week after we had started to work, I don't remember the time.  
Q. The middle of the week after you had started to work?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Was that the first time you ever heard of his going in the dressing room, or anybody?  
A. Yes.  
Q. That was the first time?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Then that was reported to this forelady?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Then when was the second time that you heard he went in there?  
A. He went in there when my sister was lying down.  
Q. Your sister was lying down, in what kind of position was your sister?  
A. She just had her feet up on the table.  
Q. Had her feet up on the table?  
A. Had them on a stool, I believe, I don't remember.  
Q. A table or stool?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Was she undressed or dressed?  
A. She was dressed.  
Q. She was dressed; do you know how her dress was?  
A. No sir, I didn't look.  
Q. You don't know that, you were not in there?  
A. Yes, sir, I was in there, but I didn't look.  
Q. Well, now, what did Mr. Frank do that time?  
A. I didn't pay any attention to it, only he just walked in and turned and walked out, looked at the girls that were sitting in the window, and walked out.  
Q. What did the girls say about that?  
A. I don't remember.  
Q. Did they talk about it at all?  
A. There was something said about it, but I don't remember.  
Q. Well now did you or not hear them say that he would go in that room and stand and stare at them?  
A. Yes, sir, I have heard something, but I don't remember exactly.  
Q. You heard that; how often did you hear that talked?  
A. I don't remember.  
Q. You don't remember how often you heard them say he walked in there and stood and stared at them?  
A. I don't remember.  
Q. You don't remember that; well now, you said about three times those things occurred, and you have given us two, Miss Mayfield and your sister, what was the other occasion?  
A. Miss Mamie Kitchens.  
Q. Miss Mamie Kitchens?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Mr. Frank walked in the dressing room on Miss Mamie Kitchens?  
A. We were in there, she and I.  
Q. You were in there and Mr. Frank came in there?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. So that was the three times you know of yourself?  
A. Yes, sir.

- Q. Then did you hear it talked of?  
A. I have heard it spoken of, but I don't remember.  
Q. You have heard them speak of other times when you were not there, is that correct?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. How many times when you were not there? That is three times you saw him; how many times did you hear them talk about it when you were not there?  
A. I don't remember.  
Q. What did they say Mr. Frank did when he would come in that dressing room?  
A. I don't remember.  
Q. Did he say anything those three times when you were there?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. Was the door closed?  
A. It was pushed to, but there was no way to fasten the door.  
Q. Pushed to, but no way to fasten it?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. He didn't come in the room?  
A. He pushed the door open and stood in the door.  
Q. Stood in the door, what kind of a dressing room was that?  
A. It was—just had a mirror in it; you mean to describe the inside?  
Q. Just describe it; was it all just one room?  
A. Yes, sir, and there were a few lockers for the foreladies.  
Q. A few lockers around the walls, a place where the girls changed their street dress and got into their working dress, and vice-versa?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Now, what else did you ever see that Mr. Frank did except go in the dressing room and stare at the girls?  
A. Nothing that I know of.  
Q. When Mr. Frank opened the door, there was no way he could tell before he opened the door what condition the girls were in, was there?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. (By Mr. Arnold): He didn't know they were in there, did he?  
A. I don't know.  
Q. That was the dressing room and the usual hour for the girls to attend the dressing room, wasn't it?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Undressing and getting ready to go to work?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Changing their street clothes and putting on their working clothes, that is true, Miss Jackson?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. That was the usual hour; you had all registered on or not, before you went up into this dressing room?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. And Mr. Frank knew the girls would stop there?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. After registering?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Now, did you hear or not any talk about Mr. Frank going around and putting his hands on the girls?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. Was that before or after he had run in the dressing room?  
A. I don't remember.

- Q. Well, he pushed the door open and stood in the door, did he?  
A. Stood in the door.  
Q. Looked in and smiled?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Didn't you say that?  
A. I don't remember now, he smiled or made some kind of a face which looked like a smile, like smiling at Ermilie Mayfield.  
Q. At Ermilie Mayfield, that day she was undressed?  
A. But he didn't speak, yes sir.  
Q. He didn't say a word, did he?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. Did he say anything about any flirting?  
A. Not to us, no, sir.

These questions and answers were objected to for the reasons above stated, and for the further reason that a statement showing improper conduct of Frank in going into the dressing rooms with girls, while improper, was intended to create prejudice against him and in no way elucidated the question as to whether he was or was not the murderer of Mary Phagan.

Movant contends that the act that the defendant had put his character in issue is no reason why reported or actual facts of immorality should be admitted in evidence over his objection. The defendant's reputation or character for immorality or loose conduct with women are not relevant subjects for consideration in determining whether the defendant has or has not a good character when such good character is considered in connection with a charge for murder.

44. Because the Court permitted the Solicitor to ask and have answered by the witness Harlee Branch the following questions, said questions and answers dealing with an incident occurring at the pencil factory, wherein Conley, after having made the third affidavit in the record purported to re-enact the occurrence between himself and Frank on April 26th, wherein the body of Mary Phagan was taken from the office floor to the cellar of the factory:

Q. Now, Mr. Branch, take this stick and that picture, and take up Conley now, and give every move he made?

A. Am I to give you the time he arrived there? (Pencil factory.)

Q. Yes, give the time he arrived.

A. I will have to give that approximately; I was to be there at 12 o'clock, and I was a few minutes late, and Conley hadn't arrived there then, and we waited until they brought him there, which was probably ten or fifteen minutes later; the officers brought Conley into the main entrance here and to the staircase, I don't know where the staircase is here—yes, here it is, (indicating on diagram) and they carried him up there, and they told him what he was there for, and questioned him, and made him understand that he was to re-enact the pantomime.

Q. Just tell what Conley did?

A. After a few minutes conversation, a very brief conversation, Conley led the officers back here and turned off to his left to a place back here, I guess this is it (indicating on diagram) right where this is near some toilets, and he says:



Q. Go ahead.

A. He was telling his story as he went through there, and he said when he got up there, he went back and he said he found this body back in that place.

Q. Go ahead and tell what he said and did.

A. He was talking constantly all the time, I don't know how he made out a part of his story.

Q. Go ahead now, and state what Conley did and said as he went through that factory?

A. Well when he got back — After reaching this point at the rear left side of the factory, described the position of the body, as he stated it, he stated the head was lying towards the north and the feet towards the south, as indicated, and there was a cord around the neck.

Q. State what he said, what he said Mr. Frank did and said.

A. He didn't state how long it took for the various movements.

Q. (By the Court): Did you time it?

A. No, sir, I know the time I arrived there and the time I left the factory.

Q. First, I want you to state what he said he did, and what he said Mr. Frank did, and then come up on the time business.

A. I don't quite understand what I am to do.

Q. Just go ahead and tell what Conley said he said, and what Conley said Mr. Frank said, and show what Conley did the day you were over there, take it up right back here where the body was and go on with it, leaving out, however, what he said about the cord and all that.

A. He said when he found the body, he came up to Mr. Frank, called to him from some point along here, I should judge (indicating on diagram), I don't understand this diagram exactly, and told him the girl was dead, and I don't know exactly what Mr. Frank said, I will try to eliminate as much of that conversation as I can. Anyhow, he said he came on up where Mr. Frank was, and that he was instructed to go to the cotton room, where he showed us, I don't know, it must be on the same side of the building, about here, I judge, (indicating) and he went in there, he showed us the cotton room, and he said he went back, and he did go back, lead us back, and told about taking up the body, how he brought it on up on his shoulder, and then in front of a little kind of impression of the wall, said he dropped it, and he indicated the place, and then he came up and told Mr. Frank about it, that he would have to come and help him, or something like that, and that Mr. Frank came back and took the feet, I believe, he said, and he took the head, and they brought the body up to the elevator and put it on the elevator.

Q. (By the Court): Was he going through all that thing?

A. Yes sir, he was enacting this all the time, and talking all the time. He described how the body was put on the elevator, and he said Mr. Frank run the elevator down, and he went on down the elevator.

Q. (By the Court): Did he go down in the elevator?

A. On this trip, yes, sir, he went down in the elevator to the basement, and he said Mr. Frank helped to take the body out, and they dropped it there, and Mr. Frank told him to take it up and carry it back, and he put the body on his shoulder and carried it back to this sawdust which is away back here, and that he came on back and there was something in here which he said he threw on this trash pile, and Mr. Frank was up, he said, in the cubby hole, he said, somewhere back there, and later he led us up there, and that Mr. Frank told him to run the elevator up, so Conley and the officers and the rest of us who were with him came up on the elevator, and when they got to the first floor, just before getting to the first floor, he said this was where

Mr. Frank got on the elevator, Mr. Frank was waiting there for him; then they brought the elevator on up to the second floor, and he had them to stop the elevator just, I suppose, a foot, or a little more below the landing, and he said Mr. Frank jumped off when the elevator was about that point, and after getting up, he said Mr. Frank went around the elevator to a sink that he showed us back of the elevator, to wash his hands, and he waited out in front, and he said he shut off the power while Mr. Frank was gone around there, and when Mr. Frank came back, they went in the office, and he led us in the office through—there is an outer office there, and he come in this way, and come through in this office back there, this inner office, and he indicated Mr. Frank's desk and a desk right behind it, I presume this is the two desks (indicating) that Mr. Frank sat down in a chair at that desk, and he told him to sit at this other desk, and Mr. Frank told him to write some notes, and he was asked by some of the officers to write what Mr. Frank had told him to write, and he sat down there and wrote one note, and I believe—I know he wrote one note, and I don't know whether he wrote one or two, and that Mr. Frank handed him some money and that later he took it back, and I don't remember whether he gave him the cigarettes and money before or after this, I don't recall. Anyway, when he was in there, after he had written the notes for the officers, I found it was time for me to get in the office with my copy, he hadn't finished, he was still sitting there, and I telephoned into the office for relief, someone to relieve me, and I went to the office, and I left him there in this office, and I went in.

- Q. What time was it when Conley got there?  
A. I should judge it was a quarter past twelve, I didn't look at my watch.  
Q. A quarter past twelve, what time did you get there?  
A. I must have gotten there five minutes before he did.  
Q. Then what time did you leave?  
A. I left about one o'clock.  
Q. What time did he begin?  
A. They rushed him right up the steps and probably two or three minutes after he got up there, he began this enactment, and he went very rapidly, in fact, we sort of trot to keep behind him.  
Q. You say you did keep behind him, were any questions asked him during that?  
A. Constantly, yes, sir.  
Q. How many people were asking him questions.  
A. Well, I suppose four or five of the officers.  
Q. How much of the talking that Conley did have you cut out?  
A. Well, I have cut out a good deal, I have no way of indicating how much.  
Q. Well, did he do or not more talking that you have stated?  
A. A great deal more.  
Q. A great deal more? How much more would you say?  
A. I have no way of estimating, he was talking constantly, except when he was interrupted by questions.  
Q. Now, Mr. Branch, do you know the amount of time that Conley spent in this? First, you say you got there at a quarter past twelve, did you?  
A. I didn't time it, but it must have been, because I was endeavoring to get there at twelve o'clock, and when I got to the office from police station, it was five or ten minutes after twelve, and I walked down just about a block and a half.  
Q. And Conley got there at what time?  
A. He came just, I should say, five minutes after I did, not longer than five minutes.

Q. Not longer than that, and he got there at 12:20, then; and what time did you go away?

A. I left a little after one.

Q. How much after one?

A. I do not know, probably five or ten minutes.

Q. One-ten then; now, how much of the time during that time you were there did it take Conley to act what he acted, leaving out the conversation he had with the different men?

A. That would be a difficult thing for me to estimate, while he was acting, he was acting very rapidly, he kept us on the run.

Q. All right; now, leave out now the time that it took this man to answer the questions that were put to him by yourself and other men that accompanied him through there, leave that out now and give us your best opinion as to how long it took Conley to go through that demonstration?

A. There was no way to do that, there was no way to disassociate the time, and find out the difference between the two, between the time he was acting and talking; I didn't attempt to do that; in fact, the only time I was interested in was the time I would have to get back to the office.

Q. You got to the office, you say about 1:10?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time, then, you say, about, you left the pencil factory?

A. I left the pencil factory between five and ten minutes after one.

Q. You left the pencil factory then at about 1:10?

A. Yes, between 1:05 and 1:10.

The defendant objected to this testimony, because (a) this so-called experiment made with Conley was solely an effort upon his part to justify his story; (b) the sayings and acts of Conley, testified about as aforesaid were the sayings and acts of Conley, not under oath, had and made without the right of cross examination, the net result of which is but a reptition of Conley's story to the jury, without the sanction of an oath, and without cross examination. That Conley went to the factory immediately after making his last affidavit; that that last affidavit is not the way he tells the story on the stand; that he tells it wholly differently on the stand; at least differently in many particulars; that it can not help the jury for Conley to go and illustrate that affidavit when he says now on the stand that much of it was a lie, and that it did not happen that way at all; that this evidence was of another transaction, not binding on this defendant.

45. Because the Court declined to allow Dr. David Marx to give testimony in behalf of the defendant as to the character of the Jewish organization known as B'Nai Brith. Defendant's counsel stated at the time that Dr. Marx would testify that while the B'Nai Brith was an international Jewish charitable organization, its charity did not extend to giving aid to persons charged with a violation of the criminal law, as was Mr. Frank in this case.

The State objected to permitting Dr. Marx to make the answer sought, and the Court declined to permit the testimony to go to the jury.



46. Because the Court permitted the witness Mrs. J. J. Wardlaw, who before her marriage was Miss Lula McDonal, to be asked by the Solicitor-General the follownig questions and to make the following answers:

Q. You never knew of his improper relations with any of the girls at the factory?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now, did you ever, do you know, or did you ever hear of a girl who went with Mr. Frank on a street car to Hapeville the Saturday before Mary Phagan was murdered?

A. No, sir.

Q. On the same street car with Hermes Stanton and H. M. Baker and G. S. Adams?

A. No, sir.

Q. And about his putting his arm around her and trying to get her at various places to get off with him?

A. No, sir.

Q. And go to the woods with him?

A. No, sir.

Q. She was a little girl that got on at the corner of Forsyth and Hunter Streets, there where the car passes?

A. No, I don't know that.

Q. You never heard of it at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. The Saturday before?

A. No, sir.

Q. You say you have never heard of any act of immorality on the part of Mr. Frank prior to April 26, 1913?

A. No, sir, I did not.

Q. You never talked with Hermes Stanton or H. M. Baker, the conductor or motorman?

Q. I will put it that way then, you never heard that, the Saturday before little Mary Phagan met her death, Mr. Frank went out on the Hapeville car on which Hermes Stanton and H. M. Baker were in charge, and that he had his arm around the little girl, and that he endeavored at various places to get that little girl to get off the car and go to the woods with him?

A. No, sir.

Q. You never heard such a statement as that at all by anybody?

A. No, sir, I did not.

The defendant objected to the above questions made by the Solicitor-General, because while the witness denied any knowledge by hearsay or otherwise of the wrong asked about, the mere asking of such questions, the answers to which must have been irrelevant and prejudicial was harmful to the defendant, and the Court erred in permitting such questions to be asked, no matter what the answers were.

The Court further erred because, although the defendant had put his character in issue, the State could not reply by proof or reputation of improper or immoral conduct with women. The reputation for lasciviousness is not involved in that general character that is material where the charge is murder.

47. Because the Court permitted the witness, W. E. Turner, at the instance of the Solicitor and over the objection of the defendant made at the time the evidence was offered that same was irrelevant, immaterial and dealt with other matters than the issues involved, to testify:

"I saw Mr. Frank talking to Mary Phagan on the second floor of the factory about the middle of March. Frank was talking to her in the back part of the building. It was just before dinner. I do not know whether anybody was in the room besides Mr. Frank and Mary. After I went in there two young ladies came down and showed me where to put the pencils. Nobody was in there but Mr. Frank and Mary at the time I went in there. Mary was going to her work when Mr. Frank stopped to talk to her. Mary told him that she had to go to work. Mr. Frank was talking about he was the Superintendent of the pencil factory. He told her that he was the Superintendent of the pencil factory and that he wanted to speak to her and she told him she had to go to work and I never did hear any more replies from either one. I left just when she told him she had to go to work. Mary backed off and Frank went on towards her talking to her. That was before I left, was when she backed off, and the last words I heard him say was he wanted to talk to her. Mary did not stand still; she moved backward about 3½ feet. While she was going backwards Mr. Frank was talking to her and walking towards her. Mr. Frank said 'I am the superintendent of the pencil factory and I want to speak to you,' and Mary said, 'I have got to go to work.'"

The Court, over the objections made as is above stated, permitted this testimony to go before the jury and in so doing committed error, for the reasons above stated.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because the transaction testified about was a transaction distinct from those making the issues in the present case, threw no light on that trial and tended to prejudice the jury against Frank upon the theory that he was seeking to be intimate with this little girl.

48. Because the Court erred in admitting to the jury, over the objection of defendant's counsel, made at the time the evidence was offered that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, dealt with collateral matters to the confusion of the issues on trial, the following extracts from the minutes of the Board of Health of the State of Georgia:

"The President then addressed the Board at length on his reasons for thinking that the Secretary should be requested to resign, the subjects dealt with being too enormous and too lengthy to be included here in their entirety. After the President's address, the Board adjourned and reassembled again at four o'clock in the afternoon, at which time Dr. Harris' side of the controversy was heard."

"The President (of the Board, Dr. Westmoreland), then addressed the Board at length on his reasons for thinking that the Secretary should be requested to resign, the subjects dealt with being too numerous and too lengthy to be included here in their entirety. After the President's address, the Board adjourned and reassembled again at four o'clock in the afternoon, at which time Dr. Harris' side of the controversy was heard."

"The Secretary not having been present at what transpired following this was not in a position to take note as to the proceeding, but was informed by

the members on adjournment that it was their wish that he should still continue as Secretary and Director of the Laboratory."

"The President then made a short statement in support of his protest against the Secretary, and reiterated some of the charges made at the previous meeting, and in addition, made objection against the Secretary's action in sending out antitoxine No. 64, which had been shown by tests made in Washington to be of less potency than it was originally labelled and also condemning the Secretary for replacing Dr. Paullin and personally taking up the investigation of the malarial epidemic around the pond of the Central of Georgia Power Company. The President then stated that he would publish the charges against the Secretary if the Board did not take such action regarding them as he thought right and proper. At the conclusion of the President's address, a talk was made by Mr. Doughty, in which he took exception to the former's attitude, and insisted—"

"At the conclusion of the President's address a talk was made by Mr. Doughty, in which he took exception to the former's attitude, and insisted that every member of the Board wished to do what was best for the State Board of Health and the people of Georgia, and that everyone connected with the Board of Health should be willing to bow to the decision of this body. He deprecated strongly the idea of giving to the press charges the publication of which could do no good, and which could only result in harm."

"On the President and Secretary being recalled an hour later, the President pro tem. Mr. Benedict, read the following resolution, which had been unanimously adopted by the Board on motion of Mr. Harbin, seconded by Dr. Brown, the resolution having been drawn by a committee appointed by the Board, consisting of Doctors Benedict, Taylor and Doughty."

"That the committee appointed to frame a resolution expressing the opinion of the Board with regard to the charges preferred against the Secretary by the President of the Board in a report to the Governor, and upon which they are called upon to act, beg to report as follows:

"Resolved, That the members of the Board present, after carefully considering the charges and all evidence in its possession, unanimously agree that while there have been certain slight irregularities in the conduct of some departments of the laboratories of the State Board of Health, which should be corrected, these irregularities have not been so important in character or result as to call for or warrant the discontinuance of Dr. Harris as Secretary and director of laboratories as demanded by the President. The Board further directs that a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the Governor."

Following the reading of this resolution, Dr. Westmoreland tendered his resignation as President of the Board, a copy of which follows:

"Atlanta, Ga., Sept. 25th, 1911.

"To the members of the Georgia State Board of Health, Atlanta, Ga. Gentlemen: I hereby tender you my resignation to take effect at this meeting. Thanking you for the courtesies extended me, and for the honor conferred on me in the past, I am, very sincerely yours, W. F. Westmoreland, President."

"Now, on pages 164 and 165; that is the letter to the Governor, adopted by the Board, and sent to his Excellency, John M. Slaton, Governor, Atlanta, Ga."

The Court admitted these extracts from the minutes over the objections of defendant, as above stated, and in so doing committed error for said reasons.

This was prejudicial to the defendant and took the minds of the jury from the issues on the trial and centered them upon a medical row had between



Dr. Westmoreland who had once been president of the State Board of Health and Dr. Harris, who had been and was its Secretary. This row between the doctors stated is utterly immaterial and irrelevant and was harmful to the defendant because it tended to discredit the testimony of Dr. Westmoreland who resigned from the Board and to sustain the testimony of Dr. Harris, who remained as Secretary of the Board after Dr. Westmoreland's resignation.

49. Because the court permitted the witness E. H. Pickett to testify over the objection made when the testimony was offered that it was wholly and entirely irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent, illegal, dealt with transactions between other parties, threw no light on the issues involved and did not bind the defendant, to testify:

"Minola McKnight at first denied that she had been warned by Mrs. Selig when she left to go to the solicitor's office on May 3rd not to talk about the case, that when asked she stated that she was on that date instructed not to talk. At first, Minola stated that her wages had not been changed by the Seligs, that she was receiving the same wages as before the crime. At first she said her wages hadn't been changed and then she said her wages had been raised, just what I can't remember because it varied from one week to another; she said the Selig family had raised her wages. The only statement she made about Mrs. Frank giving her a hat was when she made the affidavit, we didn't know anything about that hat before."

The Court permitted this testimony to go to the jury over the objections above stated and therein erred. The Court stated that he admitted this testimony on the idea that the ground of impeachment for Minola McKnight had been laid.

This testimony was prejudicial to the defendant, because the Court in admitting it, left the jury to consider the statements of Minola McKnight, that Mrs. Selig had instructed her not to talk, that the Seligs since the crime had raised her wages; that Mrs. Frank had given her a hat.

50. Because the Court permitted the witness J. H. Hendricks to testify, at the instance of the solicitor and over the objection of the defendant, that the same was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial, that:

"I am a motorman for the Georgia Railway & Power Company, running on April 26, 1913, on Marietta to Stock Yards and Decatur Street car. The Cooper and English Ave. run is on the same route from Broad and Marietta Street to Jones Ave. Prior to April 26, 1913, the English Ave. car with Mathes and Hollis on it did run to Broad and Marietta Streets ahead of time; how much ahead I can not say positively. About April 26th and subsequent thereto Mathes and Hollis, in charge of the English Ave. car, about twelve o'clock when they were due to get off at dinner did come in ahead of time. I have seen them two or three times ahead of time. At the time they were relieved, I got to Broad and Marietta streets about 12:06. When I would get there on schedule time, I don't know where Mathes and Hollis were, they should have been coming in. When Hollis would be at the corner of Broad and Marietta streets, and his car would not be there and my car would be on time, Hollis would leave Broad and Marietta street for dinner on my car."

The Court permitted this testimony to go to the jury over the objections above stated and in doing so committed error for the reasons stated. Movant contends that this was prejudicial to the defendant because it was a material matter to determine at what time his car got to Marietta and Broad streets on the day of the murder, and it confused and misled the jury to hear testimony as to when he got there upon days other than the day of the murder.

51. Because the Court permitted the witness J. C. McEwen, at the instance of and over the objection of defendant that the same was immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant, to testify:

"I am a street car motorman. Previous to April 26th I ran on the Cooper Street route something like two years. On April 26th, 1913, I was running on Marietta and Decatur Streets. The Cooper Street car or English Ave. car run by Hollis and Mathis was due in town at seven minutes after the hour; the car I was running was due at 12:10. The White City car got into the center of town at five minutes after the hour. About April 26, 1913, the Cooper Street car or English Ave. car frequently cut off the White City car due in town at 12:05. The White City car is due there before the English Ave. car; it is due five minutes after the hour and the Cooper Street car is due seven minutes after the hour. In order for the English Ave. car to cut off the White City car, the Cooper Street car would have to be ahead of time, that is, the English Avenue car would have to be ahead of time. If the White City car was on time at 12:05, the English Ave. car would have to get there before that time to cut it off. That happens quite often. I do know that the car that Mathis and Hollis were running did come into town ahead of time very often, especially if it is a relief trip. I have known it to be four or five minutes ahead of time."

The Court admitted this testimony over the objections above made and in doing so committed error for said reasons.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because it was material to his defense to show, as sworn to by the conductor and motorman, that the English Ave. car reached the corner of Broad and Marietta streets at 12:07, and it misled the jury to admit evidence tending to show that at other times this same car run by Mathis and Hollis reached the city ahead of time.

Nor would it be material for the purpose of contradicting the motorman who swore that he did not run ahead of time any time for whether he ran ahead of time at other times would be immaterial, and a witness can be impeached only as to misstatements of fact material to the issues in the case.

52. Because the Court permitted, at the instance of the solicitor and over the objection of the defendant, made when the evidence was offered, that same was irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent, the witness Henry Hoffman, to testify as follows:

"I am an inspector for the Georgia Railway & Power Co. I know Mathis, the motorman who runs on the English Ave. car. He is under me a part of the day. He was under me on April 26th, from 11:30 a. m. to 12:07 p. m. Under the schedule, his car is due at the junction of Broad and Marietta Sts. at 12:07. Prior to the beginning of this trial, I have known Mathis' car to cut off the Fair Street car. Under the schedule for the Fair St. car, it arrives in

the center of town, junction of Broad and Marietta, at 12:05. At the time Mathis was running ahead of this Fair Street car, which is due at 12:05 at the junction of Marietta and Broad Sts., the Fair Street car would be on its schedule. I have compared my watch with Mathis' watch prior to April 26th. There was at times a difference of from 20 to 35 or 40 seconds. We were both supposed to carry the right time. When I compared my watch with Mathis' I suspect mine was correct, as I just had left it the day I looked at Mathis' watch, and mine was 20 seconds difference, and I had gotten mine from Fred Williams that day. His watch was supposed to compare with the one at the barn. I called Mathis' attention to running ahead of time once or twice that I know of. Men coming in on relief time at supper and dinner, coming to the junction of Broad and Marietta, customarily come in ahead of time."

The Court admitted this testimony over the objections above made, and in doing so committed error for said reasons.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because it was material to his defense to show, as sworn to by the conductor and motorman, that the English Ave. car reached the corner of Broad and Marietta Streets at 12:07, and it misled the jury to admit evidence tending to show that at other times this same car run by Mathis and Hollis reached the city ahead of time.

Nor would it be material for the purpose of contradicting the motorman who swore that he did not run ahead of time any time, for whether he ran ahead of time at other times would be immaterial, and a witness can be impeached only as to misstatements of fact, material to the issues in the case.

53. Because the Court permitted the witness J. M. Gantt, over the objection of the defendant, made when the evidence was offered that the same was irrelevant and immaterial, to testify substantially as follows:

"The clocks of the pencil company were not accurate. They may vary all the way from three to five minutes in 24 hours."

The Court admitted this testimony over the objections made and in doing so committed error, for the reasons stated.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, because whether the clocks were or were not accurate on April 26th was material to his defense. The witness Gantt had not worked at the factory for three weeks and the fact that the clocks were not keeping accurate time three weeks before the trial was immaterial, and the evidence thereon tended to mislead and confuse the jury. Gantt had not worked at the factory during the three weeks just prior to the crime, and his testimony as to the clocks related to the time he did work at the factory.

54. Because the Court permitted the witness Scott to testify in behalf of his Agency, over the objection of the defendant, that the same was irrelevant immaterial and incompetent, substantially as follows:



"I got hold of the information about Conley knowing how to write through my operatives that I had investigating while I was out of town. McWorth told me in person when I returned."

The Court permitted this testimony over the defendant's objections, as above stated, and in doing so committed error. This was prejudicial to the defendant, because the solicitor contended that the failure of Frank to report the fact that Conley could write, was a circumstance against Frank's innocence, and he sought to show by the above testimony that the detectives were forced to get that information from someone other than Frank.

55. Because the Court permitted the witness L. T. Kendrick over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered that the same was irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent, to testify substantially as follows:

"The clock at the pencil factory, when I worked there, needed setting about every 24 hours. You would have to change it from about three to five minutes, I reckon."

The Court permitted this testimony to be heard over the above stated objections of the defendant, and in doing so committed error.

Kendricks had not worked at the factory for months and whether or not the clock was correct at that time was immaterial and tended to confuse the jury in their effort to determine whether or not the clock was accurate upon the date of the tragedy.

56. Because the Court, over the objection of the defendant made at the time the evidence was offered that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the witnesses, Miss Maggie Griffin, Miss Myrtie Cato, Mrs. C. D. Donagan, Mrs. H. R. Johnson, Miss Marie Karst, Miss Nellie Pettis, Miss Mary Davis, Mrs. Mary E. Wallace, Miss Carrie Smith and Miss Estelle Winkle to testify that they were acquainted with the general character of Leo M. Frank prior to April 26, 1913, with reference to lasciviousness, and his relations to women and girls and that it was bad.

The Court admitted this evidence over the objections above stated, and in doing so erred for the reasons herein stated.

In determining general character in cases of murder, lasciviousness or misconduct with women is not one of the traits of character involved. The traits of character involved are peacableness, gentleness, kindness, and it is utterly immaterial to prove bad character for lasciviousness in a murder trial.

To permit this evidence was highly prejudicial to the defendant. It attacked his moral character and while such attack would not tend to convict him of murder nor show him a person of such character as would likely commit murder, its introduction prejudiced the jury against him.

57. Because the Court permitted the witness Miss Dewie Hewell, over the objection of the defendant that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent, illegal and dealt with separate and distinct matters and issues from this case, to testify:

"I am now staying in the Station House. Before I came to Atlanta to testify I was in Cincinnati, Ohio, in the Home of the Good Shepherd. I worked at the Pencil Company during February and March, 1913, I quit there in March. I worked on the fourth floor and worked in the metal room, too. I have seen Mr. Frank hold his hand on Mary's shoulder. He would stand pretty close to Mary when he would talk to her, he would lean over in her face."

The Court permitted this testimony over the objection of the defendant, made as is above stated, and in doing so committed error. This was prejudicial to the defendant, because it was introduced to show an effort to be criminally intimate with Mary and inflamed and misled the jury.

58. Because the Court permitted the witness, Miss Cato, over the objection of the defendant that the same was incompetent, illegal and immaterial, to testify substantially as follows:

"I know Miss Rebecca Carson. I have seen her go twice into the private ladies' dressing room with Leo M. Frank."

The Court permitted this testimony over the objection of the defendant made as is aforesaid and in doing so committed error. The Court stated that this evidence was admitted to dispute the witness they had called.

It was wholly immaterial to the issues involved in this case whether Frank did or did not go into a private dressing room with Miss Carson. It did, however, prejudice the jury as indicating Frank's immorality with reference to women.

59. Because the Court erred in permitting the witness Maggie Griffin to testify over the objection of the defendant made when the testimony was offered that the same was immaterial, illegal, and incompetent, to testify substantially as follows:

"I have seen Miss Rebecca Carson go into the ladies' dressing room on the fourth floor with Leo M. Frank. Sometimes it was in the evening and sometimes in the morning during working hours. I saw them come in and saw them come out during working hours."

The Court permitted this testimony to go to the jury over the objection of the defendant made as is aforesaid and in doing so committed error. The Court stated that this evidence was admitted to dispute the witnesses they had called.

It was wholly immaterial to the issues involved in this case whether Frank did or did not go into a private dressing room with Miss Carson, it did, however, prejudice the jury as indicating Frank's immorality with reference to women.

60. Because the Court refused to give the following pertinent legal charge in the language requested:

"The jury are instructed that if under the evidence they believe the theory that another person committed this crime is just as reasonable and just as likely to have occurred as the theory that this defendant committed the crime, that then the evidence would not in a legal sense have excluded every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the prisoner's guilt and you should acquit him."

This request was submitted in writing and was handed to the Court before the jury had retired to consider of their verdict and before the Court began his charge to the jury.

This request was a legal and pertinent one, particularly adjusted to the facts of the case and should have been given, and the Court in declining to give it committed error, although the general principle involved might have been given in the original charge.

61. Because the Court refused to give the following pertinent legal charge in the language requested:

"If the jury believe from the evidence that the theory or hypothesis that James Conley may have committed this crime is just as reasonable as the theory that the defendant may have committed this crime, then, under the law, it would be your duty to acquit the defendant."

This request was submitted in writing and was handed to the Court before the jury had retired to consider of their verdict and before the Court began his charge to the jury.

This request was a legal and pertinent one, particularly adjusted to the facts of the case and should have been given, and the Court in declining to give it committed error, although the general principle involved might have been given in the original charge.

62. Because the Court refused to give the following pertinent legal charge in the language requested:

"The jury are instructed that in all cases the burden of proof is upon the State. The State only half carries that burden when it establishes a hypothesis of guilt, but also leaves a hypothesis of innocence. If both theories are consistent with the proved facts, the very uncertainty as to which is correct requires that the jury shall give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. But when the defendant relies upon circumstantial evidence, he is not obliged to remove the doubt. It is sufficient if he create a reasonable doubt. He is not obliged to prove his innocence. He may rely upon the failure of the State to establish his guilt. If the proved facts in the case establish a hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence and sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of his guilt, this is sufficient to acquit him and it is not necessary that he should go further in his proof and exclude every possible idea of his guilt. No such burden is upon the defendant."



This request was submitted in writing and was handed to the court before the jury had retired to consider of their verdict and before the court began his charge to the jury.

This request was a legal and pertinent one, particularly adjusted to the facts of the case and should have been given, and the Court in declining to give it committed error, although the general principle involved may have been given in the original charge.

63. Because the Court declined to give the following pertinent legal charge in the language requested:

"No presumption can arise against the defendant, because of failure to cross examine any witnesses put up by the State, that the defendant was guilty of any particular acts of wrong-doing. You should not, therefore, consider that this defendant because of such failure to cross examine any state's witnesses, has been guilty of any particular acts of wrong-doing."

The above request was submitted to the court in writing before the jury retired to consider their verdict and before the charge was given to the jury.

The above is a correct statement of the law and applicable to the present issue, and the court erred in declining to give it.

The failure to give it was prejudicial to the defendant, for the reason that quite a number of character witnesses were introduced by the state and not cross-examined by the defendant. The solicitor urged before the jury that this failure to cross-examine was evidence of the fact that a cross-examination would have brought out particular acts of wrong-doing which would have affected the defendant's character.

64. Because the court erred in declining to grant a mistrial on motion of the defendant, made by his counsel, made after the argument of the solicitor and before the charge of the court. The motion made by defendant for a mistrial is as follows:

"I have a motion to make, Your Honor, for a mistrial in this case, and I wish to state the facts on which I base it, and I wish the stenographer to take it down, and we propose to prove every fact stated in the motion unless the court will state that he knows the facts and will take cognizance of them without proof.

"First. That counsel requested before this trial began that the court room be cleared of spectators.

"Second. When the court declined to rule out the evidence as to other alleged transactions with women, by Jim Conley, the audience in the court room, who occupied nearly every seat, showed applause by the clapping of hands and stamping of feet and shouting in the presence of the court; the jury was in a room not over twenty feet from the court room—that room back there (indicating), and heard the applause. The court refused to declare a mistrial or to clear the court room on motion of the defendant.

"Third. That on Friday, August 22nd, when the trial was on and the court had just adjourned for the day, and the jury was about 200 feet from the court house proceeding north on Pryor Street, as Mr. Dorsey, the solicitor general, was leaving the court house, a large crowd assembled in front of

the court house and, in the hearing of the jury, cheered and shouted 'Hurrah for Dorsey' in the hearing of the jury.

"Fourth. That on Saturday, August 23, 1913, while the trial was still on, and when the court adjourned and Mr. Dorsey emerged from the court room a large crowd, standing on the street, applauded and cheered Mr. Dorsey, shouting 'Hurrah for Dorsey.' The jury at this time was in a cafe at lunch, about 100 feet away, and a portion of the crowd moved up in front of the cafe, at which the jury were at lunch, and in the hearing of the jury shouted 'Hurrah for Dorsey.'

"Fifth. On the last day of the trial, a large crowd, including many women, had assembled in the court room before court opened, taking up every seat in the court room. The jury were in their room not over 20 feet from the court room, and as Mr. Dorsey entered the room, the crowd applauded loudly by clapping of hands and stamping of feet, all in the hearing of the jury. The court admonished the people that if the applause was repeated, he would clear the court room.

"Now, we move upon those facts, which tend to coerce and intimidate and unduly influence this jury, that the court here and now declare a mistrial, and we stand ready to prove each and every fact there and we offer to prove them. Now, if your Honor will take cognizance of those facts as stated, then, of course it will dispense with proof. If your Honor does not take cognizance of them, we are ready to prove them by numbers of people who heard them, including myself; I have heard it, all of it, and the conduct has been most disgraceful. The defendant has not been accorded anything like a fair trial and I am disgusted, may it please your honor, with the unfairness of those members of the public who make such an exhibition of themselves when a man is on trial for his life. I am not afraid of them; I hope nobody else is afraid of them; but the natural tendency is to intimidate a jury, to coerce a jury, and I have never seen a trial so hedged in and surrounded with manifestations of public opinion. I make the motion to declare a mistrial and stand ready to prove these facts. If the court knows them, the court can take cognizance of them."

Upon this motion the Court stated that as to part of the facts he knew and part he did not know. That what occurred on August 25, 1913, the last day of the trial, he did know, as it took place in his presence; that he did hear cheering when Mr. Dorsey went out on the occasion mentioned, but as to what the crowd said, outside of the whooping and holloing, he did not know, and that he did hear the applause in the court room when the court declined to rule out the evidence as to several alleged transactions with women, by Jim Conley.

In support of this motion to declare a mistrial, the following evidence was introduced:

Mr. Deavours testified that he was a deputy sheriff of Fulton County in charge of the jury on Saturday when Mr. Dorsey was applauded in front of the court house as he left that house. When the applauding begun, the jury was in or near the German Cafe, where they went to dinner. When the applause first begun they were about 100 feet from the court house, entering the cafe. That he heard the applause, but did not hear the crowd holla "Hurrah for Dorsey;" he heard the holloing and cheering and the jury could have heard what he did. That the applause he heard was outside of the cafe, he did not hear the cheering from the inside of the cafe. That he did not remember how many people came up in front of the cafe. No one came in the cafe into the room where the jury was, that is, in the room in the rear.

Mr. Arnold testified: I wish to state that on Friday when court adjourned Mr. Dorsey left the court room and as he left the court room I heard loud cheering at the front. On Saturday, when court adjourned, I asked Mr. Dorsey not to go out until the jury had gotten away from where they could hear the noise of the crowd, for fear they should cheer him again as he left the court room. Mr. Dorsey said all right, and remained in the court room for a while. Finally, I thought the crowd had left, and I presume Mr. Dorsey thought the crowd had left, and of course I do not claim that he is responsible for the cheering, but he finally left the court room and went out, and I went out with Mr. Rosser shortly afterwards, behind him. As Mr. Deavours says, it turned out that the jury had not at that time entered the German Cafe, although I didn't see them. I saw people up there but I didn't know who they were, but as Mr. Dorsey left the court room there were loud and excited cheers and cries of "Hurrah for Dorsey." My judgment is that you could have heard the cheers and cries of "Hurrah for Dorsey" without any trouble, all the way from the court house up Alabama street; that is my opinion. They kept cheering him and as my friend went across the street the cries continued until he got clear into the Kiser building. The first cheering was on Friday afternoon, but the second time was on Saturday when I asked Mr. Dorsey not to go out. I asked Mr. Dorsey not to go out until the crowd dispersed. He stayed in; I am not trying to blame Mr. Dorsey for it. I didn't know the crowd was waiting out there, and I presumed the jury had gotten out of hearing but found they had not. I didn't hear the case mentioned; I heard no allusion to this case but I heard cries of "Hurrah for Dorsey," but on the other occasions—while I love for my friend to meet all the approbation that he may get from the public, I did think that it was an outrage, the crying and shouting; that is what I thought. If the jury were where Mr. Deavours said they were, they could hear; no trouble about hearing it, if they had good ordinary hearing. On Friday I was in the court room when I heard most of the crying; I do not know where the jury was then.

Charles F. Huber testified: I was in charge of the jury when they left the court room Friday afternoon. I do not know how far the jury had gotten before the crowd began cheering in front of the court house. I didn't know myself that they had cheered until the next morning. They didn't know it at all. I had charge of the rear end of the jury. I have good hearing and I heard no cheering.

After the introduction of this testimony, Mr. Arnold for the defense stated that he desired time to examine Mr. Pennington and Mr. Liddell, the other two bailiffs in charge of the jury, who were then absent and asked the court to give him time to make the proof.

After the hearing of this request and the above evidence, the Court ruled: "Well, I am going to charge this jury on this case, and I will give you an opportunity, don't you understand, afterwards, to complete your showing about that, but I will overrule the motion."

During the hearing of this motion for a mistrial and when the witness Charles F. Huber was on the stand and swore that he heard no cheering on the Friday afternoon referred to, and that the jury did not hear it, there was applause among the spectators, on account of the statement that the jury did not hear the cheering. Mr. Arnold called attention to the applause, stating to the Court that the crowd could not be held in even while they were making this investigation.



The Court paid no further attention to this applause than to ask, "What is the matter with you over there?"

In failing to grant the mistrial requested, the Court erred. The motion, taken in connection with the admitted and proven facts, movant contends, clearly show that the defendant was not having a fair trial by reason of the great excitement of the crowd. The court room was in an exceedingly small building, on the ground floor, and was crowded during the whole of the trial and defendant contends that this prejudice and animosity of the crowd against him, as shown by the frequent applause, necessarily reached the jury box and prevented him from having a fair trial.

As permitted by the Court, in his order just aforesaid, we attach hereto in support of this motion for new trial the affidavits hereto attached, marked Exhibits J to AA, both inclusive, and said Exhibits are hereby made a part of this motion for new trial.

65. Because the defendant contends he did not have a fair and impartial trial, by an impartial jury, as provided by the Constitution and laws of this State, for the following reasons, to-wit:

(a) On August 6, 1913, during the trial, the defendant's counsel moved to rule out the testimony of the witness Conley tending to show acts of perversion and acts of immorality on the part of the defendant, wholly disconnected with and disassociated from this crime. The Court declined to rule out said testimony and immediately upon the statement of the Court that he would let such testimony remain in evidence before the jury there was instant, pronounced and continuous applause throughout the crowded court room where the trial was being had, by clapping of hands and by striking of feet upon the floor.

While the jury was not then in the same room where the trial was being had, they were in a room about 50 feet from where the judge was sitting and about 20 feet from portions of the crowd applauding, and so close that perhaps the jury could have heard the applauding.

(b) And again during the trial, Mr. Arnold, one of the counsel for the defendant, in the presence of the jury, objected to a question asked by the solicitor, and the following colloquy took place:

Mr. Arnold: I object to that, your Honor, that is entering the orders on that book merely; that is not the question he is asking now at all.

The Court: What is the question he is asking now?

(Referring to questions asked by the solicitor-general.)

Mr. Arnold: He is asking how long it took to do all this work connected with it. (Referring to work done by Frank the day of the murder.)

The Court: Well, he knows what he is asking him.

(Referring to the solicitor-general.)

Upon this suggestion of the Court that the solicitor knew what he was doing, the spectators in the court room applauded by striking their hands together and by the striking of feet upon the floor, creating quite a demon-

stration. Defendant's counsel complained of the conduct of the spectators in the court room. The Court gave no relief except directing the sheriff to find out who was making the noise.

(c) During the examination by Mr. Arnold, counsel for the defendant, of V. H. Kreigshaber, a witness for the defendant, there was laughter in the audience sufficiently generally distributed throughout the audience and loud enough to interfere with the examination. Mr. Arnold called the Court's attention to the interruption for the purpose of obtaining some action from the Court thereon.

The Court stated that if there was other disorder, no one would be permitted in the court room the following day and requested the sheriff to maintain order.

(d) That during the trial, on Friday, August 22d, 1913, when the Court had just adjourned for the day, and the jury was about 300 feet away from the court house, proceeding north on Pryor Street, as Mr. Dorsey, the solicitor-general, was leaving the court room, a large crowd assembled in front of the court house, and in the hearing of the jury cheered and shouted "Hurrah for Dorsey."

(e) That during the trial, on Saturday, August 23, 1913, when court adjourned and Mr. Dorsey emerged from the court room, a large crowd, standing on the street, applauded and cheered him, shouting "Hurrah for Dorsey." At that time the jury was between the court house and what is known as the German Cafe and near enough to the crowd to hear the cheering and shouting. A portion of the crowd moved up in front of the cafe at which the jury were at lunch, and in the hearing of the jury shouted "Hurrah for Dorsey."

(f) On the last day of the trial, Monday, August 25th, 1913, a large crowd, including many women, had assembled in the court room before court opened, taking up every seat in the court room. The jury were in their room about 20 feet from the court room, and as Mr. Dorsey entered the room the crowd applauded loudly by clapping of hands and stamping of feet, which the jury perhaps could have heard. The court did nothing but admonish the people that if the applause was repeated, he would clear the court room.

(g) On Monday the last day of the trial after the argument of counsel had been had and the charge of the court had been given and the case was in the hands of the jury, when Solicitor Dorsey left the court room a very large crowd awaited him in front of the court house and shouted and applauded by clapping their hands and shouting, "Hurrah for Dorsey."

(h) When it was announced that the jury had agreed upon a verdict, the Judge of the Superior Court, his Honor, L. S. Roan, went to the court house which was a comparatively small room on the first floor, at the junction of Hunter and Pryor Streets, and found the court room packed with spectators. Fearful of misconduct among the spectators in the court room, the

Court of his own motion cleared the room before the jury announced their verdict. When the verdict of guilty was rendered, the fact of the rendition of such verdict was signaled to the crowd on the outside, which consisted of a large concourse and crowd of people standing upon Hunter and Pryor Streets. Immediately upon receiving such signal and while the court was engaged in polling the jury and before the polling ended, great shouts arose from the people on the outside, expressing gratification. Great applauding, shouting and halloing was heard on the streets and so great became the noise on the streets that the Court had difficulty in hearing the responses of the jurors as he polled them. These incidents showed, as the defendant contends, that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury trial and that the demonstration of the crowds attending court was such as to inevitably affect the jury.

The exhibits hereto attached marked J to AA inclusive are made a part of this ground.

66. Because that fair and impartial trial guaranteed him by the Constitution of this State was not accorded the defendant for the following reasons:

The court room wherein this trial was had was situated at the corner of Hunter and Pryor streets. There are a number of windows on the Pryor Street side looking out upon the street and furnishing easy access to any noises that would occur upon the street. The court room itself is situated on Hunter Street, 15 or 20 feet from Pryor Street. There is an open alleyway running from Pryor St., along by the side of the court house, and there are windows from the court room looking on to this alley and any noise in the alley can easily be heard in the court room. When Solicitor Dorsey left the court room on the last day of the trial, after the case had been submitted to the jury, a large and boisterous crowd of several hundred people was standing in the street in front of the court house and as he came out greeted him with loud and boisterous applause, taking him upon their shoulders and carrying him across the street into the Kiser building wherein was his office. This crowd did not wholly disperse during the interval between the giving of the case to the jury and the time when the jury reached its verdict, but during the whole of such time a large crowd was gathered at the junction of Pryor and Hunter streets. When it was announced that the jury had reached a verdict, his Honor, Judge L. S. Roan, went to the court room and found it crowded with spectators to such an extent as to interfere with the court's orderly procedure, and fearing misconduct in the court room, his Honor cleared it of spectators. The jury was then brought in for the purpose of delivering their verdict. When the verdict of guilty was announced, a signal was given to the crowd on the outside to that effect. The large crowd of people standing on the outside cheered and shouted and hurraed at the outset of the poll of the jury, and before more than one juror had been polled to such an extent that the Court had some difficulty in proceeding with



the poll of the jury, which was then in progress, and not finished. Indeed, so great was the noise and confusion without that the Court heard the responses of the jurors during the polling with some difficulty. The Court was about 10 feet from the jury. In the court room was the jury, lawyers, newspaper men, and officers of the court, and among them there was no disorder.

The polling of the jury is an important part of the trial. It is inconceivable that any juror, even if the verdict was not his own, to announce that it was not, in the midst of the turmoil and strife without.

The exhibits J to AA inclusive are hereby made a part of this ground, and the Court will err if it does not grant a new trial on this ground.

67. Because the Court erred in failing to charge the jury that if a witness knowingly and wilfully swore falsely in a material matter, his testimony shall be rejected entirely, unless it be corroborated by facts and circumstances of the case or other creditable evidence.

The Court ought to have given this charge, although no written request was formally made therefor, for the reason that the witness Jim Conley, who testified as to aiding Frank in the disposal of the body, was attacked by the defendant as utterly unworthy of belief, and he admitted upon the stand that he knew that he was lying in the affidavits made by him, with reference to the crime and before the trial.

Especially ought this charge to have been given, because the Court, in his charge to the jury, left the question of the credibility of witnesses to the jury, without any rule of law to govern them in determining their credibility.

68. Because the Court permitted to be read to the jury, over the objection of the defendant made at the time the testimony was offered, that same was immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and not binding upon Frank a part of an affidavit made by the witness Minola McKnight, as follows:

"They pay me \$3.50 a week, but last week she paid me \$4, and one week she paid me \$6.50. Up to the time of this murder I was getting \$3.50 per week and the week right after the murder I don't remember how much she paid me, and the next week they paid me \$3.50 and the next week they paid me \$6.50, and the next week they paid me \$4, and the next week they paid me \$4. One week, I don't remember which one, Mrs. Selig gave me \$5, but it wasn't for my work, and they didn't tell me what it was for, she just said 'Here is \$5 Minola.'"

The Court permitted this part of the affidavit to be read to the jury over the objections above stated, and in doing so erred for the reasons stated.

This was prejudicial to the defendant, inasmuch as it permitted the affidavit of the witness Minola McKnight to be read to the jury as to transactions between herself and the Seligs, with which Frank had no connection, but which the solicitor-general insisted showed that Frank's relatives were seeking to influence this darkey by paying her money in addition to that which she earned. The Seligs and Minola McKnight had been asked

on cross examination if these statements in this affidavit were true, and had denied that these statements were true.

69. Because the Court erred in permitting Mr. Hooper, for the State, to argue to the jury that the failure of the defense to cross-examine the female witnesses who, in behalf of the State, had testified to the bad character of Frank for lasciviousness, was strong evidence of the fact that, if the defendant had cross-examined them, they would have testified to individual incidents of immorality on the part of Frank; that the defendant's knowledge that they would bring out such incidents was the reason for not cross-examining the witnesses; and that the jury could, therefore, reasonably know that Frank had been guilty of specific incidents of immorality other than those brought out in the record.

The defendant strenuously objected to this line of argument on the part of Mr. Hooper and urged the Court to state to the jury that the failure to cross-examine any of said witnesses justified no inference on the part of the jury that the cross-examination, if had, would have brought out anything hurtful to the general character of Frank.

This the Court declined to do and permitted the argument; and, in so doing, committed error, for which a new trial should be granted.

70. Because the solicitor-general, in his argument to the jury, stated, as follows: "The conduct of counsel in this case, as I stated, in refusing to cross-examine these twenty young ladies, refutes effectively and absolutely that he had a good character. As I said, if this man had had a good character, no power on earth could have kept him and his counsel from asking where those girls got their information, and why it was they said that this defendant was a man of bad character. Now, that is a common sense proposition; you'd know it whether it was in a book or not. I have already shown you that under the law, they had the right to go into that character, and you saw that on cross-examination they dared not do it. . . . Whenever anybody has evidence in their possession, and they fail to produce it, the strongest presumption arises that it would be hurtful if they had; and their failure to introduce evidence is a circumstance against them. You don't need any law book to make you know that; that is true, because your common sense tells you that whenever a man can bring the evidence, and you know that he has got it and don't do it, the strongest presumption arises against him. And you know, as twelve honest men seeking to get at the truth, that the reason these able counsel did not ask those hair-brained fanatics, as Mr. Arnold called them before they had ever gone on the stand—girls whose appearance is as good as any they brought, girls that you know by their manner on the stand are speaking the truth, girls who were unimpeached and unimpeachable, the reason they didn't ask them. Why? They dared not do it. You know it; if it had never been put in the law books, you would know it."

This address of the solicitor was made in the hearing, and in the presence of the jury, without any protest or comment on the part of the Court.

The defendant made no objection to this argument at the time same was being had, for the reason that similar argument made by Mr. Hooper had been objected to by counsel, and their objection overruled. The objection made to the argument of Mr. Hooper was not here repeated, for the reason that the Court had stated, in the outset of the case, that objection once noted in the record need not in similar instances be repeated, but that the Court would assume that similar objections had been made and overruled.

This argument of the Solicitor was not only illegal, but prejudicial to the defendant, in that he, in substance, urged upon the jury that a cross-examination of female witnesses for the State, who testified to Frank's bad character for lasciviousness, would, upon cross-examination, have testified as to specific acts of immorality against him.

71. Because the Court permitted the solicitor, over the objection of defendant's counsel, to argue before the jury that the wife of the defendant did not speedily visit him when he was first taken under arrest, and that her failure to do so showed a consciousness on her part that her husband was not innocent.

In addressing this question to the jury, the solicitor said: "Do you tell me that there lives a true wife, conscious of her husband's innocence, that would not have gone through snap-shotters, reporters, and everything else to have seen him? Frank said that his wife never went there because she was afraid that the snap-shotters would get her picture, because she didn't want to go through the line of snap-shotters. I tell you, gentlemen of the jury, that there never lived a woman conscious of the rectitude and innocence of her husband who would not have gone through snap-shotters, reporters, and the advice of any rabbi under the sun—and you know it."

Defendant's counsel objected to this line of argument, when the same was being made, upon the ground that the conduct of his wife could in no sense be used as evidence of Frank's guilt, and that the solicitor had no right to argue as he did.

The Court declined to stop the argument, but permitted it to continue. The solicitor impassionately argued it to the jury—that Mrs. Frank's conduct in not visiting her husband was strong evidence of his guilt.

This argument was highly prejudicial to the defendant, and the Court erred in permitting it to be made and in not reprimanding the solicitor-general for the making of such an argument.

72. Because the Court permitted the solicitor-general, in arguing the relative value of the expert testimony delivered by the physicians called for the State and defense, to intimate that the defense, in calling its physicians,



had been influenced by the fact that certain physicians called were the family physicians of some of the jurors. In discussing it, the solicitor said: "It would not surprise me if these able, astute gentlemen, vigilant as they have shown themselves to be, did not go out and get some doctors who have been the family physicians, who are well known to some of the members of this jury, for the effect it might have upon you; and I am going to show that there must have been something besides the training of these men, and I am going to trace them with our doctors. I can't see any other reason in God's world for getting out and getting these practitioners, who have never had any special training on stomach analysis, and who have not had any training on the analysis of tissues—like a pathologist has had, except upon that theory."

Objection was made to this argument of the solicitor, at the time it was being made, upon the ground that there was no evidence to support any such argument; that it was illegal, prejudicial, and highly improper.

73. Because the juror, A. H. Henslee, was not a fair and impartial juror, but was prejudiced against the defendant when he was selected as a juror, had previously thereto formed and expressed a decided opinion as to the guilt of the defendant; and, when selected as a juror, was biased against the prisoner in favor of the State. Affidavits are hereto attached and marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, I, BB, CC, DD, EE and JJ, KK, LL, MM, NN, which are hereby made a part of this motion for new trial. Affidavits sustaining the character of the witnesses against said Henslee are hereto attached, marked Exhibits FF, GG, HH, and II.

The conduct of this juror, as shown by the affidavits and other evidence, the condition, conduct, and state of mind of this juror is conclusive that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury trial, as provided by the laws and the Constitution of this State; and a new trial should be granted. Upon failure to do so, the Court will commit error.

74. Because the juror, Johenning, was not a fair and impartial juror, in that he had a fixed opinion that the defendant was guilty prior to, and at the time he was taken on the jury and was not a fair and impartial and unbiased juror. Affidavits showing that he was not a fair and impartial juror are hereto attached and marked Exhibits E, F, G, K, and I, and made a part of this motion for new trial.

The opinion, conduct, and state of mind of this juror prior to, and at the time of, his selection as a juror shows that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial trial, as provided by the laws and the Constitution of this State; and, because of the unfairness and impartiality of this juror, a new trial should be granted, and the Court will commit error in not granting it.

75. Because this defendant, as he contends, did not have a fair and impartial jury trial, guaranteed to him under the laws of this State, for the following reasons, to-wit:

Public sentiment seemed to the Court to be greatly against him. The court room was a small room, and during the argument of the case so far as the Court could see about every seat in the court room was taken, in and without the bar, and the aisles at each end of the court room were packed with spectators. The jury, in going from the jury seats to the jury room, during the session of the court, and in going to and from the court room morning, evening and noon, were dependent upon passage-ways made for them by the officers of court. The bar of the court room itself was crowded, leaving only a small space to be occupied by counsel in their argument to the jury. The jury-box, when occupied by the jury, was inclosed by the crowd sitting and standing in such close proximity thereto that the whispers of the crowd could be heard during a part of the trial. When the Court's attention was called to this he ordered the sheriff to move the crowd back, and this was done.

During the argument of the solicitor, Mr. Arnold of counsel for the defense, made an objection to the argument of the solicitor, and the crowd laughed at him, and Mr. Arnold appealed to the Court.

On Saturday, prior to the rendition of the verdict on Monday, the Court was considering whether or not he should go on with the trial during Saturday evening, or to what hour he should extend it in the evening, the excitement in and without the court room was so apparent as to cause apprehension in the mind of the Court as to whether he could safely continue the trial during Saturday afternoon; and, in making up his mind about the wisdom of thus continuing the trial, his Honor conferred with, while on the stand, and in the presence of the jury, the chief of police of Atlanta and the colonel of the Fifth Georgia regiment stationed in Atlanta conferred with his Honor. Not only so, but the public press, apprehending trouble if the case continued on Saturday, united in a request to the Court that he not continue the Court on Saturday evening. The Court, being thus advised, felt it unwise to extend the case on Saturday evening, and continued it until Monday morning. It was evident on Monday morning that the public excitement had not subsided, and that it was as intense as it was on Saturday previous. The same excited crowds were present, and the court house was in the same crowded condition. When the solicitor entered the court room he was met with applause by the large crowd—ladies and gentlemen present by stamping their feet and clapping their hands, while the jury was in their room about twenty feet away.

While Mr. Arnold, of the defense, was making a motion for a mistrial, and while taking testimony to support it before the Court, the crowd applauded when the witness testified that he did not think the jury heard the applause of the crowd on Friday of the trial. The jury was not in the court room, but were in the jury room about 20 feet away.

When the jury was finally charged by the Court, and the case submitted to them, and when Mr. Dorsey left the court room, a large crowd on the outside of the court house, and in the streets, cheered by yelling, and clapping hands, and yelling "Hurrah for Dorsey!"

When it was announced that the jury had agreed upon a verdict, crowds had thronged the court room to such an extent that the Court felt bound to clear the court room before receiving the verdict. This the Court did. But, when the verdict of the jury was rendered, a large crowd had thronged the outside of the court house; someone signaled to the outside what the verdict was, and the crowd on the outside raised a mighty shout of approval. So great was the shouting and applause on the outside that the Court had some difficulty in hearing the response of the jurors as he called them.

The defendant was not in the court room when the verdict was rendered, his presence having been waived by his counsel. This waiver was accepted and acquiesced in by the Court, because of the fear of violence that might be done the defendant were he in court when the verdict was rendered.

When Mr. Dorsey left the court room, he was met at the court house door by a multitude, was hurrahed, cheered, taken upon the shoulders of a part of the crowd and carried partly to the building opposite, wherein he had his office.

This defendant contends that the above recital shows that he did not have a fair and impartial jury trial; that a new trial ought to be granted; and that the Court, failing to grant such new trial, will commit error.

In support of this ground of the motion movant refers to the affidavits hereto attached marked Exhibits J to AA, inclusive, and hereby made a part of this motion for new trial.

76. Because the Court erred in not leaving it to the jury to say whether or not, under the facts, the witness Conley was an accomplice.

The State insisted that Conley was watching for Frank to enable him to have connection with some girl, naturally or unnaturally; and Frank seeking to get her consent and failing killed her to insure her silence, and then employed Conley who had previously been watching for him to enable him to conceal her body.

If Conley was aiding and abetting Frank in his transactions with Mary Phagan, and if, as a natural and probable result of such transaction, Mary Phagan met her death, then Conley would be an accomplice of Frank, although he had no personal part in her killing.

The Court, under proper instructions, ought to have left it to the jury to say whether Conley was or not an accomplice of Frank; and, in failing to do, and because he failed to do so the Court committed error.

77. The Court erred in not charging the jury that if, under instructions given them, they found that Conley was an accomplice of Frank, they could



not convict Frank under the testimony of Conley alone; but that, to do so, there must be a witness other than Conley or circumstances corroborating the evidence of Conley.

78. Because the Court permitted the witness, Irene Jackson, at the instance of the solicitor-general, and over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the testimony was offered, that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, illegal, and prejudicial to the defendant, to testify substantially as follows:

"I remember having a conversation with Mr. Starnes about a dressing room incident. I told him that Mr. Frank came to the door of the dressing room while Emily Mayfield was dressing. He looked and turned around and walked out—just pushed the door open and looked in. I don't know whether he smiled or not. I never noticed to see whether he smiled or not; he just kind of looked at us and turned and walked out. I didn't time him as to how long he stayed; he just came and looked and turned and walked out. At the time, Miss Emily Mayfield had off her top dress and was holding her old dress in her hand to put it on. I did not report that to the forelady, but Miss Ermilie did. I have heard remarks other than those of Miss Mayfield about Frank going into the dressing room, but I don't remember who said them. I just remember I heard something about it, two or three different times, but I don't remember anything about it, just a few times. I heard the girls talking about Mr. Frank going into the dressing room on two or three different occasions. It was the middle of the week after we started to work there; I don't remember the time. Mr. Frank also entered the dressing room when my sister was in there lying down; she just had her feet up on the table; she had them on a stool, I believe. She was dressed. I don't remember how her dress was; I didn't look. I paid no attention to him, only he just walked in and turned and walked out; looked at the girls that were sitting in the window and walked out. There was something said about this, but I don't remember. I have heard something about him going in the room and staring at them, but I don't remember exactly. Mr. Frank walked in the dressing room on Miss Mamie Kitchens. She and I were in there. I have heard this spoken of, but I don't remember. I have heard them speak of other times, when I wasn't there. Mr. Frank said nothing either time when I was there. The door was pushed to, but there was no way to fasten the door. He pushed the door open and stood in the door. The dressing room had a mirror in it. It was all one room, except there were a few lockers for the foreladies, and there was a place where the girls changed their street dresses and got into their working dresses, and vice versa. There was no way for Mr. Frank to tell before he opened the door what the condition of the girls was in there. I do not know whether he knew they were in there or not. That was the usual time for the girls to go in the dressing room, undress and get ready to go to work, changing their street clothes and putting on their working clothes. We had all registered on before we went up there in the dressing room. Mr. Frank knew the girls had stopped there to register. The day he looked in the dressing room at Miss Mayfield, he smiled, or made some kind of a face that looked like a smile—smiling at Miss Mayfield, he didn't speak or didn't say a word."

This evidence was objected to for the reasons above stated, and for the further reason that statements tending to show the conduct of Mr. Frank with girls, in going into the dressing room with girls, was intended to create

prejudice in the minds of the jurors against the defendant; and, not to illustrate the question of whether he was or was not the murderer of Mary Phagan. The Court overruled these objections and let the testimony go to the jury; and in doing so, movant contends, erred for the reasons above stated.

79. Because the Court permitted the witness, Harlee Branch, at the instance of the solicitor-general, to testify to incidents at the pencil factory, wherein Conley, after having made the third affidavit, purported to re-enact the occurrence of the murder between himself and Frank, wherein the body of Mary Phagan was taken from the office floor to the cellar of the factory, the testimony permitted by the Court being substantially as follows:

"I will have to give you the time of Conley's arrival at the factory, approximately. I was up there at twelve o'clock, and I was a few minutes late. Conley had not arrived there then. We waited until they brought him there, which was probably ten or fifteen minutes later. The officers brought Conley into the main entrance of the factory here and to the stair-case—I don't know where the stair-case is here—yes, here it is (indicating on diagram) and they carried him up here and told him what he was there for, and questioned him, and made him understand that he was to re-enact the pantomine. After a few minutes conversation, and a very brief conversation, Conley led the officers back here and turned off to his left to a place back here; I guess this is it (indicating on diagram), right where this is near some toilets, and he was telling his story as he went through there, and he said when he got up there, he went back and found this body in that place. He was talking constantly—all the time; I don't know how he made out a part of his story. Well, when he got back— After reaching this point at the rear left side of the factory, describing the position of the body, as he stated it, he stated the head was lying towards the north and the feet towards the south, as indicated, and there was a cord around the neck. He didn't state how long it took for the various movements. I didn't time it; I know the time I arrived there and the time I left the factory. Conley said when he found the body he came up to Mr. Frank—called to him some point along here I should judge (indicating on the diagram). I don't understand this diagram exactly. And he told him the girl was dead, and I don't know just exactly what Frank said. I will try to eliminate as much of that conversation as I can. Anyhow, he said he came on up to where Mr. Frank was, and that he was instructed to go to the cotton room, which he showed us; I don't know, it must be on the same side of the building about here, I judge (indicating) and he went in there. He showed us the cotton room, and he said he went back, and he did go back, led us back, and told about taking up the body, how he brought it up on his shoulder, and then, in front of a little kind of impression on the wall, he said he dropped it, and he indicated the place, and then he come up and told Mr. Frank about it—that he would have to come and help him or something like that—and that Mr. Frank came back and took the feet, I believe he said, and he took the head, and they brought the body up to the elevator and put it on the elevator. He was enacting this all the time and talking all the time. He described how the body was put on the elevator, and he said Mr. Frank run the elevator down, and he went down on the elevator. On this trip he went down in the elevator to the basement, and he said Mr. Frank helped to take the body out, and they dropped it there, and Mr. Frank told him to take it up and



carry it back, and he put the body on his shoulder and carried it back to this sawdust which is away back here, and that he came on back, and he said there was some things in here which he threw on this trash pile, and Mr. Frank, he said, was up in the cubby hole, he said—somewhere back there—and later he led us up there—and that Mr. Frank told him to run the elevator up; so Conley and the officers and the rest of us who were with him came up in the elevator; and when they got to the first floor, just before getting to the first floor, he said this was where Mr. Frank got on the elevator. Mr. Frank was waiting there for him. Then they brought the elevator on up to the second floor, and he had them to stop the elevator, just, I suppose, a foot or a little more below the landing; and he said Mr. Frank jumped off when the elevator was about that point, and after getting up, he said Mr. Frank went around the elevator to a sink that he showed us back of the elevator, to wash his hands; and he waited out in front and he said he shut off the power while Mr. Frank was gone around there; and when Mr. Frank came back, they went in the office, and he led us on in the office through—there is an outer office there, and he came in this way and come through in this office back here, this inner office, and he indicated Mr. Frank's desk and a desk right behind it;—I presume this is the two desks (indicating); that Mr. Frank sat down in the chair at that desk, and he told him to sit at the other desk, and Mr. Frank told him to write some notes; and he was asked by some of the officers to write what Mr. Frank told him to write, and he sat down there and wrote one note, and I believe—I know the note he wrote, and I don't know whether he wrote one or two, and that Mr. Frank handed him some money and that later he took it back, and I don't remember whether he gave him the cigarettes and money before or after this, I don't recall. Anyway, when he was in here, after he had written the notes for the officers, I found it was time for me to get in the office with my copy. He hadn't finished; he was still sitting there; and I telephoned in to the office for relief—someone to relieve me—and I went to the office and I left him there in the office, and I went in. I judge it was about a quarter past twelve when Conley got there. I must have gotten there five minutes before that time. I left about one o'clock. They rushed Conley right up the steps and, probably two or three minutes after he got up there, he began this enactment, and he went very rapidly—we sort of trotted to keep behind him. Questions were constantly asked him by four or five of the officers. I have cut out a good deal of Conley's talking; just how much, I have no way of indicating. He was talking constantly, except when interrupted by questions. I didn't time it when I got there. When I got to the office from the police station it was ten minutes after twelve and I walked down just about a block and a half. Conley got there, I should say, about five minutes after I did. I left a little after one, probably five or ten minutes. It would be a difficult thing for me to estimate how much time it took Conley to enact what he did, leaving out the conversation he had with different men. While he was acting, he was acting very rapidly; he kept us on the trot. There is no way for me to give you my opinion as to how long it took Conley to go through that demonstration; there was no way to disassociate the time and find out the difference between the two—between the time he was acting and talking. I didn't attempt to do that.”

The defendant objected to this testimony, because:

- (a) This so-called experiment made with Conley was solely an endeavor on their part to justify his story.



(b) The sayings and actings of Conley, as aforesaid, not under oath, had and made without cross-examination, and reported by the witness to the Court, the net result of which is a repetition of Conley's statement, without the sanction of an oath.

(c) That Conley went to the factory immediately after making his last affidavit; that that last affidavit is not the way he tells the story on the stand; that he tells it wholly differently on the stand; at least differently in many particulars; that it can not help the jury for Conley to go to illustrate that affidavit when he says now on the stand that much of it was a lie, and that it did not happen that way at all; that this evidence was of another transaction, not binding upon this defendant.

The Court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony to the jury; and, in doing so, committed error, for the reasons above stated.

80. Because the Court, over objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Miss Maggie Griffin, to make the following answers:

Q. Are you acquainted with the general character of Leo M. Frank for lasciviousness; that is his relations with women?

A. Yes, sir.

The Court admitted the above question and answer, over the objection of the defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

81. Because the Court, over objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Miss Myrtie Cato, to make the following answers:

Q. Miss Cato, I want to ask you one other question, also. Are you acquainted with the general character of Leo M. Frank for lasciviousness; that is, his relations towards women?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it good or bad?

A. Bad.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over objection of the defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

82. Because the Court, over objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Mrs. H. R. Johnson, to make the following answers:

Q. Now, are you acquainted with his (Frank's) general character for lasciviousness; that is, his general character towards women generally?

A. No, sir, not very much.

Q. Not very much? Well, answer the question: yes or no; are you acquainted?

A. All right, she said, not very much.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over the objection of defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

83. Because the Court, over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Miss Marie Carst, to make the following answers:

Q. Bad; now, Miss Carst, I will ask you if you are acquainted with his (Frank's) general character for lasciviousness; that is, his attitude towards girls and women?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that character good or bad?

A. Bad.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over the objection of the defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

84. Because the Court, over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Miss Nellie Pettis, to make the following answers:

Q. Are you acquainted with his (Frank's) general character for lasciviousness; that is, with women prior to that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it good or bad?

A. Bad.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over objection of the defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

85. Because the Court, over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Miss May Davis, to make the following answers:

Q. I want to ask you another question.—Are you acquainted with the general character of Leo M Frank, prior to April 26, 1913, as to lasciviousness; that is, his relations with girls and women?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that good or bad?

A. Bad.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over objection of the defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

86. Because the Court, over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent,

illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Mrs. Mary E. Wallace, to make the following answers:

Q. I will ask you now if you are acquainted with his general character for lasciviousness; that is, as to his (Frank's) attitude towards girls and women?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that good or bad?

A. Bad.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over the objection of the defendant as above stated, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

87. Because the Court, over the objection of the defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, that the same was immaterial, incompetent, illegal and prejudicial to the defendant, permitted the solicitor-general to ask the following questions, and the witness, Miss Estelle Winkle, to make the following answers:

Q. Are you acquainted with his (Frank's) general character for lasciviousness; that is, his relations with girls and women?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that good or bad?

A. Bad.

The Court admitted the above questions and answers, over objection of defendant, made at the time the evidence was offered, and thereby erred, for the reasons stated.

88. Because the Court erred, over the objection of the defendant that the same was irrelevant and immaterial and prejudicial to defendant, in permitting the witness, Louis Ingram, to testify as follows:

"I am a conductor for the Georgia Railway & Power Co. I come to town ahead of them cars coming in on English Avenue going to Cooper Street, known as the English Avenue car. I have seen them come in and been on it when it come in, the English Avenue car due at the junction of Marietta and Broad Streets according to schedule at 12:07. I have seen the car due at Marietta and Broad streets according to schedule at 12:07, the English Avenue car, several times come in ahead of the car I was coming in on, as much ahead as four minutes. I saw a car that came in this morning that was due in town at 8:30 and it got in at 8:24. I know the Motorman Matthews. I have seen his car ahead of time. I could not say how often."

The Court permitted this testimony over the objection before stated, and in doing so erred for the reasons stated. This was prejudicial to the defendant because it tended to show that at times other than on the day of the murder, the English Avenue car, which on that day was run by the witness, Motorman Matthews, had reached Marietta and Broad Streets four minutes ahead of time. It became material to determine what time this English Avenue car reached Broad Street on the day of the murder. The Motorman Matthews and the conductor, swore that on that day the English



Avenue car reached Broad Street at 12:07. The Court permitted this and other like testimony to be introduced as tending to discredit their statements that the car was on schedule time that day. In doing this the Court erred, for the fact that the English Avenue car was ahead of time as much as four minutes on other days did not indicate that it was ahead of time on the day of the murder.

89. Because the Court erred, over the objection of the defendant that the same was irrelevant and immaterial and prejudicial to defendant, in permitting the witness, W. D. Owens, to testify as follows:

"I run on what is known as Route Eight, White City to Howell Station, for the Georgia Railway & Power Co. We were due in town at 12:05. My schedule is ahead of the Cooper Street and English Avenue schedule two minutes. I have known the English Avenue and Cooper Street car to get to the junction of Marietta and Broad Streets ahead of my car. The English Avenue car is due there at 12:07; my schedule at 12:05. I have known the English Avenue car to get there as much as two minutes ahead of us. That would make the English Avenue car four minutes ahead of time. I have known this to occur after April 26th. I don't know whether it occurred prior to that time."

The Court permitted this testimony over the objection before stated, and in doing so erred for the reasons stated. This was prejudicial to the defendant because it tended to show that at times other than on the day of the murder, the English Avenue car, which on that day was run by the witness, Motorman Matthews, had reached Marietta and Broad Streets four minutes ahead of time. It became material to determine what time this English Avenue car reached Broad Street on the day of the murder. The Motorman Matthews and the conductor, swore that on that day the English Avenue car reached Broad Street at 12:07. The Court permitted this and other like testimony to be introduced as tending to discredit their statements that the car was on schedule time that day. In doing this the Court erred, for the fact that the English Avenue car was ahead of time as much as four minutes on other days did not indicate that it was ahead of time on the day of the murder.

90. Because of the following colloquy which occurred during the trial and while the witness, John Ashley Jones, was on the stand, during the cross-examination of Jones by the solicitor:

Q. You never heard anybody down there say anything about Mr. Frank's practices and relations with the girls.

A. Not in the Pencil Factory.

Q. Not at all? You never did talk to any of these young girls, did you?

A. No, I don't happen to know any of them.

Q. Or any of the men?

A. No.

Q. You don't know what kind of practices Mr. Frank may have carried on down there in the Pencil Factory?

A. No.

Q.—You don't know, you never heard anybody say that Mr. Frank would take girls in his lap in his office here?

A. No.

(Here objection was made by Mr. Arnold.)

The Court: On cross examination he can ask him if he has heard of certain things.

Mr. Arnold: Up to April 26th?

The Court: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dorsey: I am not four-flushing or any such thing; I am going to bring the witnesses here.

Q. You never heard of Frank going out there to Druid Hills and being caught did you, before April 26th?

A. No, but our reporter, it was his business to find out, and if he had found it out, he certainly would not have issued such a policy.

Q. Now, about twelve months ago, you never heard of Frank kissing girls and playing with their nipples on their breast around there?

A. No, I never heard such a thing.

Q. You never heard of that at all?

A. I never heard that. I had been in Mr. Frank's—

Q. You never talked to Tom Blackstock, then, did you?

A. I haven't the pleasure of Mr. Blackstock's acquaintance.

Q. Did you ever know Mrs. L. D. Coursey?

A. I can't say that I ever heard of her.

Q. Miss Myrtie Cato, you never heard of her, and that he would go into the—

A. Mr. Dorsey, I have been down there.

By the Court: He wants to know if you ever heard of that before.

Q. He made no apology and no explanation, but just walked right on in there when they were lying on the couch?

A. I never heard that.

Q. Did you ever hear of his putting his arms around Myrtie Cato in the office?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear about the time he went in on little Gertie Jackson that was sick, lying in the dressing room with her dress up, and stood up there and looked at her, and hear any talk of the girls there about his attitude?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear about his frequently going into the dressing room with Vernie McDaniel?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear of the time it was said that Miss Pearl Darlson—about five years ago, when he held out the money in one hand and put his hand on the girl, that she threw the monkey wrench at him? You never heard of that time?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever talk to Mrs. Martin Donegan?

A. No, sir, not that I know of.

Q. Did you ever hear them say that he paid special attention to the girls, and winked and smiled at them, and had nude pictures hung up in his office, and walked around and slapped the girls on the seat?

A. No, sir.

Q. Miss Wingate, 34 Mills Street, did you ever talk to her about Frank?

A. No, sir, I don't know her.

Q. Did you ever hear C. D. Donegan talk about Frank?

A. No, sir.

Q. You never heard any of these factory people talk about him?

A. No, sir.

The Court erred in permitting the solicitor, although the witness denied hearing all of the remarks referred to, to say in the presence of the jury that he was not four-flushing, but that he was going to bring the witnesses there, thereby improperly saying to the jury that he had such witnesses and meant to bring them in.

The Court erred in not withdrawing this whole subject from the jury and in not rebuking the solicitor-general for injecting the questions in the case and asserting that he had witnesses to prove the things asked about.

These suggestions and intimations of the solicitor-general were exceedingly prejudicial to the defendant, and for making them he ought to have been severely rebuked by the Court, and failure of the Court to do so was cause for a new trial.

91. Because the Court erred in charging the jury as follows:

"Is Leo M. Frank guilty? Are you satisfied on that beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case? Or is his plea of not guilty the truth?"

The Court erred in putting the proposition of the defendant's guilt or innocence to the jury in this manner, because the effect of the same was to put the burden upon the defendant of establishing his plea of not guilty, and the further effect was to impress upon the jury that unless they believed that the defendant's plea of not guilty was the truth that they could not acquit. The tendency of this charge was to impress upon the jury that they were to consider only upon the one side as to whether they believed Leo M. Frank guilty or upon the other side they were to consider only the question of whether they believed his plea of not guilty, and there was no middle ground in the case. And movant says that the error in this charge is that it leaves entirely out of view the consideration of the third proposition which the jury had the right to consider, and that is as to whether, even though they did not believe his plea of not guilty the truth, still if they had a reasonable doubt in their minds of his guilt they should acquit him.

92. Movant further says that a new trial should be granted because of the following:

Mr. Dorsey, the solicitor-general, in the concluding argument, made the following statement:

"Now, gentlemen (addressing the jury) Mr. Arnold spoke to you about the Durant case. That case is a celebrated case. It was said that that case was the greatest crime of the century. I don't know where Mr. Arnold got his authority for the statement that he made with reference to that case. I would you like to know it."

Whereupon the following colloquy occurred:



Mr. Arnold: I got it out of the public prints, at the time, Mr. Dorsey, published all over the country, I read it in the newspapers, that's where I got it.

Mr. Dorsey (resuming): On April 15, 1913, Mr. C. M. Pickett, the district attorney of the City of San Francisco, wrote a letter—

Mr. Arnold: I want to object to any communication between Mr. Pickett and Mr. Dorsey—it's just a personal letter from this man, and I could write to some other person there and get information satisfactory to me, no doubt, just as Mr. Dorsey has done, and I object to his reading any letters or communications from anybody out there.

Mr. Dorsey: This is a matter of public notoriety. Here's his reply to a telegram I sent him, and in view of his statement, I have got a right to read it to the jury.

Mr. Arnold: You can argue a matter of public notoriety, you can argue a matter that appears in the public prints—my friend can, but as to his writing particular letters to particular men, why that's introducing evidence, and I must object to it; he has got a right to state simply his recollection of the occurrence, or his general information on the subject, but he can't read any letters or telegrams from any particular people on the subject.

Mr. Dorsey: Mr. Arnold brought this in, and I telegraphed to San Francisco, and I want to read this telegram to the jury; can't I do it?

Mr. Arnold: If the Court please I want to object to any particular letter or telegram,—I can telegraph and get my information as well as he can, I don't know whether the information is true, I don't know who he telegraphed about it; I have got a right to argue a matter that appears in the public prints, and that's all I argued,—what appears in the papers,—it may be right or wrong, but if my friend has a friend he knows there, and writes and gets some information, that's introducing evidence, and I want to put him on notice that I object to it. I have got the same right to telegraph there and get my own information. And besides, my friend seems to know about that case pretty well, he's writing four months ago. Why did he do it?

Mr. Dorsey (resuming): Because I anticipated some such claim would be made in this presence.

Mr. Arnold: You anticipated it, then, I presume, because you knew it was published; that's what I went on.

Mr. Dorsey (resuming): I anticipated it, and I know the truth about that case.

Mr. Arnold: I object to his reading any communication unless I have the right to investigate it also; I am going only on what I read in the public press. April 15th is nearly two weeks before the crime is alleged to have been committed. I want to record an objection right now to my friend doing any such thing as that, reading a telegram from anybody picked out by my friend Dorsey, to give him the kind of information he wants for his speech, and I claim the right to communicate out there myself and get such information as I can, if he's given the right to do it.

The Court: I'll either have to expunge from the jury what you told the jury, in your argument, or—

Mr. Arnold: I don't want it expunged. I stand on it.

The Court: I have either got to do one of the two—

Mr. Dorsey: No, sir, can't I state to this jury what I know about it, as well as he can state what he knows?

Mr. Arnold: Certainly he can, as a matter of public notoriety, but not as a matter of individual information or opinion.

The Court: You can state, Mr. Dorsey, to the jury, your information about the Durant case, just like he did, but you can't read anything—don't introduce any evidence.

Mr. Dorsey (resuming): My information is that nobody has ever confessed the murder of Blanche Lamont and Minnie Williams. But, gentlemen of the jury, as I'll show you by reading this book, it was proved at the trial, and there can be no question upon the fact, Theodore Durant was guilty, the body of one of these girls having been found in the belfry of the church in question, and the other in the basement. Here's the book containing an account of that case, reported in the 48 Pacific Reporter, and this showed, gentlemen of the jury, that the body of that girl, stripped stark naked, was found in the belfry of Emanuel church, in San Francisco, after she had been missing for two weeks. It shows that Durant was a medical student of high standing, and a prominent member of the church, with superb character, a better character than is shown by this man, Leo M. Frank, because not a soul came in to say that he didn't enjoy the confidence and respect of every member of that large congregation, and all the medical students with whom he associated. Another thing, this book shows that the crime was committed in 1895, and this man Durant never mounted the gallows until 1898, and the facts are that his mother took the remains of her son and cremated them, because she didn't want them to fall into the hands of the medical students, as they would have done in the State of California, had she not made the demand and received the body. Hence, that's all poppy-cock he was telling you about. There never was a guiltier man, there never was a man of higher character, there never was a more courageous jury or better satisfied community, than Theodore Durant, the jury that tried him, and the people of San Francisco, where he lived and committed his crime and died.

Movant says that a new trial should be granted, because of the fact that the Court did not squarely and unequivocally rule that the jury should not consider the statement Mr. Dorsey made as to the letter C. M. Pickett, the district attorney, had written, and that a new trial should be granted because the argument was illegal, unwarranted, not sustained by the evidence, and tended to inflame and unduly prejudice the jury's mind. Neither the letter from Pickett, nor the telegram was read further than is shown in the foregoing statement.

93. The movant says that a new trial should be granted because of the following ground:

The solicitor-general having, in his concluding argument, made the various statements of fact about the Durant case, as shown in the preceding ground of this motion, the judge erred in failing to charge the jury as follows, to-wit:

"The jury are instructed that the facts in other cases read or stated in your hearing are to have no influence upon you in making your verdict. You are to try this case upon its own facts and upon the opinion you entertain of the evidence here introduced."

94. Movant says that a new trial should be granted because of the following ground:

The solicitor-general having, in his concluding argument, made the various statements of fact about the Durant case, as shown in the preceding ground of this motion, the judge erred in failing to charge the jury as follows, to-wit:

"The jury are instructed that the facts in other cases read or stated in your hearing are to have no influence upon you in making your verdict. You are to try this case upon its own facts and upon the opinion you entertain of the evidence here introduced."

95. Because the Court should have given in charge the instruction set forth in the preceding ground, because of the following argument made by the solicitor-general, in his concluding argument to the jury, said argument being a discussion of the facts of other cases, and requiring such charge as was requested, the remarks of the solicitor-general, in conclusion, being as follows:

"Oscar Wilde, an Irish knight, a literary man, brilliant, the author of works that will go down the ages—Lady Windemere's Fan, De Profundis, which he wrote while confined in jail; a man who had the effrontery and the boldness, when the Marquis of Queensbury saw that there was something wrong between this intellectual giant and his son, sought to break up their companionship; he sued the Marquis for damages, which brought retaliation on the part of the Marquis for criminal practices on the part of Wilde, this intellectual giant; and wherever the English language is read, the effrontery, the boldness, the coolness of this man, Oscar Wilde, as he stood the cross-examination of the ablest lawyers of England—an effrontery that is characteristic of the man of his type,—that examination will remain the subject matter of study for lawyers and for people who are interested in the type of pervert like this man. Not even Oscar Wilde's wife—for he was a married man and had two children,—suspected that he was guilty of such immoral practices, and, as I say, it never would have been brought to light probably, because committed in secret, had not this man had the effrontery and the boldness and the impudence himself to start the proceeding which culminated in sending him to prison for three long years. He's the man who led the aesthetic movement; he was a scholar, a literary man, cool, calm, and cultured, and as I say, his cross-examination is a thing to be read with admiration by all lawyers, but he was convicted, and in his old age, went tottering to his grave, a confessed pervert. Good character? Why, he came to America, after having launched what is known as the 'aesthetic movement' in England, and throughout this country lectured to large audiences, and it is he who raised the sunflower from a weed to the dignity of a flower. Handsome, not lacking in physical or moral courage, and yet a pervert, but a man of previous good character. Abe Ruef, of San Francisco, a man of his race and religion, was the boss of the town, respected and honored, but he corrupted Schmitt, and he corrupted everything that he put his hands on, and just as a life of immorality, a life of sin, a life in which he fooled the good people when debauching the poor girls with whom he came in contact, has brought this man before this jury, so did eventually Abe Ruef's career terminate in the penitentiary. I have already referred to Durant. Good character isn't worth a cent when you have got the case before you. And crime don't go only with the ignorant and the poor. The ignorant, like Jim Conley, as an illustration, commit the small crime, and he doesn't know anything about some of this higher type of crimes but a man of high intellect and



wonderful endowments which, if directed in the right line, bring honor and glory; if those same faculties and talents are perverted and not controlled, as was the case with this man, they will carry him down. Look at McCue, the mayor of Charlottesville; a man of such reputation that the people elevated him to the head of that municipality, but notwithstanding that good reputation, he didn't have rock-bed character, and becoming tired of his wife, he shot her in the bath-tub, and the jury of gallant and noble and courageous Virginia gentlemen, notwithstanding his good character, sent him to a felon's grave. Richeson, of Boston, was a preacher, who enjoyed the confidence of his flock. He was engaged to one of the wealthiest and most fascinating women in Boston, but an entanglement with a poor little girl, of whom he wished to rid himself, caused this man, Richeson to so far forget his character and reputation and his career as to put her to death. And all these are cases of circumstantial evidence. And after conviction, after he had fought, he at last admitted it, in the hope that the governor would at last save his life, but he didn't do it, and the Massachusetts jury and the Massachusetts governor were courageous enough to let that man who had taken that poor girl's life to save his reputation as the pastor of his flock, go, and it is an illustration that will encourage and stimulate every right-thinking man to do his duty. Then, there's Beattie. Henry Clay Beattie, of Richmond, of splendid family, a wealthy family, proved good character, though he didn't possess it, took his wife, the mother of a twelve-months'-old baby, out automobiling, and shot her; yet that man, looking at the blood in the automobile, joked, joked, joked! He was cool and calm, but he joked too much; and although the detectives were abused and maligned, and slush funds to save him from the gallows were used in his defense, a courageous jury, an honest jury, a Virginia jury, measured up to the requirements of the hour and sent him to his death, thus putting old Virginia and her citizenship on a high plane. And he never did confess, but left a note to be read after he was dead, saying that he was guilty. Crippen, of England, a doctor, a man of high standing, recognized ability and good reputation, killed his wife because of infatuation for another woman, and put her remains away where he thought as this man thought, that it would never be discovered; but murder will out, and he was discovered, and he was tried, and be it said to the glory of old-England; he was executed."

96. Movant further says that a new trial should be granted because of the following ground:

The solicitor-general, in his concluding argument, spoke to the jury as follows:

"But to crown it all, in this table which is now turned to the wall, you have Lemmie Quinn arriving, not on the minute, but to serve your purposes, from 12:20 to 12:22 (referring to a table which the defendant's counsel had exhibited to the jury giving, as was claimed by counsel, in chronological order, the happening of events as to defendant on April 26) but that, gentlemen, conflicts with the evidence of Freeman and the other young lady, who placed Quinn by their evidence, in the factory before this time."

Whereupon the following occurred:

Mr. Arnold: There isn't a word of evidence to that effect; those ladies were there at 11:35 and left at 11:45, Corinthia Hall and Miss Freeman, they left there at 11:45, and it was after they had eaten lunch and about to pay their fare before they ever saw Quinn, at the little cafe, the Busy Bee. He says that they saw Quinn over at the factory before 12, as I understood it."

Mr. Dorsey: Yes, sir, by his evidence.

Mr. Arnold: That's absolutely incorrect, they never saw Quinn there then, and never swore they did.

Mr. Dorsey (resuming): No, they didn't see him there; I doubt if anybody else saw him there, either.

Mr. Arnold: If a crowd of people here laughs every time we say anything how are we to hear the Court? He has made a whole lot of little misstatements, but I let those pass, but I am going to interrupt him on every substantial one he makes. He says those ladies saw Quinn,—says they say Quinn was there before 12, and I say he wasn't there, and they didn't say that he was there then.

The Court: What is it you say, Mr. Dorsey?

Mr. Dorsey: I was arguing to the jury the evidence.

The Court: Did you make a statement to that effect?

Mr. Dorsey: I made a statement that those two young ladies say they met Holloway as he left the factory at 11:05—I make the statement that as soon as they got back down to that Greek cafe, Quinn came in and said to them, "I have just been in and seen Mr. Frank."

Mr. Arnold: They never said that, they said they met Holloway at 11:45, they said at the Busy Bee Cafe, but they met Quinn at 12:30.

Mr. Dorsey: Well, get your record,—you can get a record on almost any phase, this busy Quinn was blowing hot and blowing cold, no man in God's world knows what he did say, but I got his affidavit there.

Mr. Arnold: I have found that evidence, now, Mr. Dorsey, about the time those ladies saw Quinn.

Mr. Dorsey: I'll admit he swore both ways.

Mr. Arnold: No, he didn't either. I read from the evidence of Miss Corinthia Hall: Then Mr. Dorsey asked her: "Then you say you saw Lemmie Quinn right at the Greek cafe at five minutes to twelve, something like that?"

A. "No, sir, I don't remember what time it was when I saw him, we went into the cafe, ordered sandwiches and a cup of coffee, drank the coffee and when we were waiting on the change he came in." And further on, "All he said (Quinn) was he had been up and had seen Mr. Frank, that was all he said?" A. "Yes, sir," and so on. Now the evidence of Quinn: "What sort of clock was that?"—he's telling the time he was at DeFoor's pool parlor—"What sort of clock was that? A. Western Union clock. Q. What did the clock say when you looked at it? A. 12:30." And he also swore that he got back to the pencil factory at 12:20, that's in a half dozen different places.

The Court: Anything contrary to that record, Mr. Dorsey?

Mr. Dorsey: Yes, sir, I'm going to show it by their own table that didn't occur—that don't scare anybody and don't change the facts.

The Court erred, under the foregoing facts, in not restraining the solicitor-general from making the erroneous statements of fact objected to by defendant's counsel, which the evidence did not authorize, and in permitting him to proceed, and in not rebuking the solicitor-general, and in not stating to the jury that there was no such evidence as the solicitor-general had stated, in the case, and defendant says that for this improper argument, and for this failure of the Court, there should be granted a new trial.

97. Movant further says that a new trial should be granted because of the following:

In his concluding argument Solicitor-general Dorsey, referring to the defendant's wife, and referring to the claim made by the solicitor-general that